THEOLOGY

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EDITORIAL

H. Leonard Pass, Canon of Chichester, was one of the most remarkable men of his generation. Once, in an expansive mood, he said that the fact of his Jewish parentage was to him an insoluble mystery, but there is little doubt that, like St. Paul, he owed to it much of what he afterwards became. His father in Christ was Canon E. G. Wood, of Cambridge, and Pass, though his song was always of mercy as well as of judgment and though there was a liberal quality about his Catholicism which he had not learned from Wood, remained a grateful and affectionate disciple of that strange, devoted master of the Canon Law. There was in Pass a great capacity for both the giving and receiving of affection. He was a man of many friends. He thought much of them, and had prayerful hopes for them, and they were stimulated to have the like for him. He was also a man of many plans, which matured slowly, but were not forgotten or laid aside. He was sure—and indeed it now seems certain that he was right—that he was called of God to do something for the double cause of faith and learning at Cambridge. He set himself to gather round him a group of junior graduates. These presently came to be called at times the younger school of Cambridge theologians, a title now true only in a spiritual sense. Out of this grew St. Anselm's House.

Pass was at that time a layman, and even though the holy old Bishop Richardson, formerly of U.M.C.A., lived there for a time, the order of the House was like that of the Celtic monasteries. Pass was the Abbot. He sat at the head of the table, and said grace. During the War Pass developed a surprising capacity for Y.M.C.A. work, and in 1915 and 1916 he received Deacon's and Priest's Orders. He had been a

shepherd of souls for many years, and his priesthood, when it came, was very precious to him. Of his work at Chichester, as Principal of the College, as Vicar of a tiny city parish and finally as Residentiary Canon, we ourselves know only at second-hand, but it was marked by the qualities which had given distinction to his Cambridge work. His pious devotion to the glory of God and his determination helped him to overcome physical deficiencies, frail health, desperately bad eyesight, and some other limitations. The paper printed in this number was written by him for a Conference on Eucharistic Doctrine held at King's College in 1930. Those who are familiar with his expositions of the New Testament and of the *Anima Christi* will recognize the same accurate learning and the same devout purpose.

The Report of the Doctrinal Commission continues to have the approval of those whose judgment is most to be desired. Ill-informed persons decry it. It is unhappily noticeable in the letters printed in the secular press that some of the writers seem to think solely of what the immediate effect of the Report on some comparatively trifling issue is likely to be, and not of its relation to the truth. They argue, "If this kind of thing is going to be said by responsible teachers, my prejudices will receive a shock." They do not seem to ask themselves, "Is it true?" This is a disastrous line, along which no progress can be made. At the same time the Report is condemned by two sections of the Church, who have their principles and their reasons but have no belief in the value of theology as it is understood by this Journal. We have been taught—and among our teachers Bishop Gore will long keep his honoured place—that in order to be a Christian and a churchman it is not only unnecessary but actually wrong to forgo the use of "the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel, the spirit of knowledge." We have been taught that our hopes of inheriting "the spirit of ghostly strength, the spirit of true godliness, the spirit of holy fear," will not thereby be endangered. Two sections of the Church appear to be of another opinion. They are supplied already with all the truth that they require, and they do not want any more.

The Protestant Reformation Society sees "alarming concessions made to the rationalistic spirit which pervades so much modern theology," and "for once finds itself in agreement with the *Tablet* when it asks, 'Is the residuum of positive Christian

belief broad enough to give a firm footing to those who are launching the campaign for a national Recall to Religion ?' " Some of the difficulties felt by this Society are no doubt inevitable. Their members are distressed by any mention of sacrifice in the Lord's Supper, or by any hint of sanction for any kind of Reservation, and are apt to expect that " definite repudiation of papal errors in doctrine " shall find a place in every Anglican pronouncement. This distress cannot, we fear, be avoided. But in two respects the P.R.S. seem to have imperfectly understood the Report. Their manifesto deplores " the subordination of the Articles to the devotional element (*sic*) in the Book of Common Prayer." What in fact is said in the Report is this:

> The Articles are, in their influence upon the life and thought of the Church, inevitably far less formative than the Prayer Book; for the constant worship of any group of Christians must exercise upon them a far more pervasive and penetrating influence than that of any formula to which the worshipping congregation has no frequent occasion to refer, especially when that formula is found to be largely concerned with questions no longer foremost in our minds.

Could anything have been more harmless, or better said ?

In another matter the P.R.S. rather hastily assumes the worst. They quote from page 37 of the Report what they describe as " the perilous assertion " that:

> Statements affirming particular facts may be found to have value as pictorial expressions of spiritual truths, even though the supposed facts themselves did not actually happen.

But this is a general remark about statements of any kind, and relates to such statements as that a woman ate an apple in a garden, or that a man wrestled all night with an angel. These statements, whether true or not, clearly have spiritual value. So have many statements in secular mythology, as for example the statement that the Knights of King Arthur's Round Table engaged in laborious and dangerous adventures on behalf of oppressed persons. This is encouraging to read, whether it ever happened or not. The Report, having said this, goes on to consider the possibility that " symbolism " of this kind may enter into (*a*) the Christian tradition and (*b*) the Creed. The conclusion is that:

> It is, however, in any case essential to hold that the facts underlying the Gospel story—which story the Creeds summarize and interpret—were such as to justify the Gospel itself.

From the other quarter—and here we expressly exclude Mr. Athelstan Riley's temperately-worded criticism—come no less condemnatory judgments of another kind. We have not seen any classified statement of those judgments, only such generalizations as the opinion that the Report "will make us the laughing-stock of Christendom." They seem to proceed from a temper of mind which assumes that Christian theology was finished once for all at the Council of Trent. They have the effect of sending simple Bible Christians and Prayer-Book Churchmen like ourselves back to the consideration of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. What is meant by such words as "He shall teach you all things;" "He shall guide you into all the truth;" "He shall glorify me: for He shall take of mine, and shall declare it unto you?" We hope to print before long the judgment of a distinguished American theologian on the Report, but in the meantime we cannot forbear to ask—Does development then mean nothing? It is plain that there must be limits. A development which caused the tradition to deny itself, to reverse itself, to become unrecognizable, would be illegitimate. But can it be seriously contended that the theology which is, not stated, but hinted at, outlined, and in places sketched with greater fulness in the Report, is unrecognizable as Christian theology? It is much to be hoped that, if the Report, like St. Paul's severe letter to the Corinthians, has made some "sorry," it will prove to have been "but for a season," and also that they were "made sorry unto repentance," so that they may suffer loss by the Report of the Doctrinal Commission in nothing.

There are two other classes of persons whose reception of the Report is interesting enough to deserve comment. There seem to be a number of good, steady Churchmen who are disturbed by the Report because they were not prepared for it. It disturbs them to find that there is uncertainty in the minds of some Christian theologians and teachers about the sense in which some articles of the Creed should be interpreted. They did not know that such uncertainty existed. Our comment on this is twofold. In the first place, all those who were familiar with the situation knew it quite well. It did exist, and the Church after the publication of the Report is no whit worse off than it was before. In the second place the whole power and enthusiasm of the Report is on the orthodox side, and here and there, just at the end of the persuasive argument, comes the *caveat*. It looks (and this is pure conjecture—we have no inside knowledge of what happened) as if the

Commission had been almost united, and every now and then two or three members had said at the end of a session, "You know, we are afraid we cannot quite affirm all that." Accordingly, a note indicating divergence was added.

There is another class of persons who say in effect, "We recognize that in every generation, especially in this, there must be some leaders of theological thinking, who grapple with boundary-problems, at points where Christian theology marches with philosophy, the natural sciences, historical criticism, psychology, and so forth. We understand that this requires an adventurous spirit, and causes risks to be taken. We can see that there must be occasional suspension of judgment. This does not disturb us. It does not seem to us to touch the main tradition, in the strong flow of which we ourselves live happily." Of these, some—not all—would have preferred that the Report should not be made so public as it has been. It might, for example, have been written in Latin.

This leads to a final comment. Anglicans are accustomed not to avoid, even to court publicity for their laundry-work. We do not try cases *in camera*, nor are we fond of secret reports. This is our way, and if there is danger in it, there is also gain. But, even so, we do not always seem to make the wisest possible arrangements. It would, perhaps, have been better if the Commission had reported to the Archbishops, by whom they were appointed, and if the Archbishop had then published their Report, with a note indicating the degree of authority which is to be assigned to it. At present, it is not easy to see what authority it has. It is not official. It is not the Voice of the Church of England. On the other hand, there is no likelihood that the Church will repudiate it, and it is certain to affect the thought and action of the Church very much. It may be, of course, that the Convocations will consider the Report, and pronounce upon it. Till then we do not quite know whether we ought to receive it and judge it as sons of the Church who are interested in modern theology or as persons interested in modern theology who are sons of the Church.

MEMORANDUM ON THE SACRIFICIAL ASPECT OF THE EUCHARIST

THERE are three necessary preliminaries to the consideration of the sacrificial aspect of the Eucharist: (1) The origin and nature of sacrifice in general; (2) atonement as effected by the sacrifice of Our Lord; (3) the nature and character of sacraments.

On the first of these subjects there does not yet exist any unanimity among anthropologists and students of comparative religion. On the second, the greatest divergence of opinion exists among theologians and philosophers. As to the third, it is a question which is especially occupying the attention at the present day of careful thinkers of various schools.

Further, it is undeniable that even among those who hold most strongly to the idea of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, the greatest divergence of opinion exists as to its explanation. This is true of writers both ancient and modern. Consequently the subject presents quite exceptional difficulty, and it follows that, in a brief memorandum, all that can be attempted is to select and suggest certain lines of thought which may possibly serve as the basis of a discussion which, it is hoped, may bring about some kind of agreement, or at least removal of misunderstanding.

Historically the subject presents less difficulty. As early as the third and fourth centuries, the idea of the Eucharistic Sacrifice had become a matter of theological speculation to writers such as Cyprian, Ambrose, Augustine, Chrysostom and others. It was indeed a selection of passages from the writings of these fathers which formed the basis of the Eucharistic literature which began to make its appearance from the ninth century onwards.

But the idea of the Eucharist as a sacrifice was no new thing in the third and fourth centuries, and it can be traced back to the sub-apostolic age without any difficulty. It is thus part of that teaching of the ancient fathers and undivided Church to which the Anglican Church makes her consistent appeal.

It would appear also to fulfil another and even more important requirement, namely, that it can claim the warrant of Holy Scripture. The teaching of Scripture must, however, be taken as a whole, that of St. Paul and the Epistle to the Hebrews along with the records of the Institution.

St. Paul in more than one passage uses language which appears to be of a sacrificial character (*cf.* 1 Cor. x. 16-21 and 1 Cor. xi. 26, 27). The following paraphrase by Dr. Swete of

1 Cor. xi. 27 is surely justifiable: "This identification of the Cup and the Bread with the sacrificed humanity of the Lord is so complete, so truly a fact in the spiritual world, that to eat and drink unworthily is to incur the guilt of profaning the Lord's Body."

In this connection, however, controversy has generally centred upon the accounts of the Institution, and much energy has been expended on attempting to evaluate the words, "Do this in remembrance of Me." It must be clearly stated that it is not here suggested that these words, in themselves, have any sacrificial significance, and it must also be remembered that the records of the Institution present grave textual difficulties which it is here impossible to discuss. It may therefore be best to confine our attention to one point only.

It is so generally agreed that Our Lord's death upon the Cross was sacrificial that this may be here assumed. But it has been very properly suggested that it was exactly at the Last Supper that Our Lord invested His impending death with the character of a sacrifice. "This is My Body which is for you" (St. Paul); ". . . given for you" (St. Luke). "This cup is the new covenant in My Blood" (St. Paul); "this is My Blood of the covenant which is shed for many" (St. Mark).

Further, it can hardly be doubted that the very earliest tradition of the Eucharist regarded it as a commemoration of the Lord's death. It is true that St. Paul may have been the first to attempt to systematize the theological implications of this idea, but it seems clear from his teaching that the sacrificial notion was at least latent from the beginning, and that it found explicit statement as early as the writing of 1 Cor. (*circa* A.D. 55). Nor does this teaching appear to have called forth any opposition, and henceforward we find it evidenced by an almost unbroken chain of writers that the sacrificial aspect of the Eucharist claims general recognition as a part of Christian teaching.

Luther, however, vehemently repudiated the sacrificial idea of the Eucharist. In this he was followed by most, if not all, of the Continental reformers, and by a large proportion of English divines. His objection was that any sacrificial idea applied to the Eucharist would derogate from the all-sufficiency of the sacrifice of the Cross. In support of this view the Epistle to the Hebrews was freely quoted—*e.g.*, ix. 18 and x. 10-14; but the exegesis of these passages need not detain us, because any view of the Eucharistic sacrifice which would derogate from the all-sufficiency of the sacrifice of the Cross is clearly to be rejected, and it may be safely urged that the best and most reliable tradition has always safeguarded this

principle. In our own formularies this is made sufficiently clear—*e.g.*, in the Prayer of Consecration in the Book of Common Prayer and in Art. XXXI.

Modern thought has also been much influenced by research into the origin and history of sacrifice in general. It is possible to extract from conflicting views on this subject certain principles about which there appears to be a more or less general agreement. Thus it is now very commonly held that the essence of sacrifice consists in an external act or rite, whereby the worshipper believes that he is able to establish a direct contact between himself and the deity. In the course of this rite something is commonly forfeited or destroyed. The object of this contact is normally the obtaining of some advantage, or the averting of some evil, either for the worshipper himself or for some other person or persons. The advantage most commonly sought was the participation in some spiritual strength, of which an external power was supposed to be the source. With this latter idea is most closely associated that of communion, and it has even been stated by a competent authority that the core of worship is communion, and that this conception is the fundamental principle underlying the most rudimentary forms of sacrifice. It has, however, been stated more recently by another eminent anthropologist that the fundamental concept in the institution of sacrifice is belief in blood as the vitalizing essence charged with life-giving power.

There is, however, another aspect of the subject which demands special attention, namely, that the idea of sacrifice necessarily includes the concept of its acceptability. It therefore very commonly assumes the aspect of a covenant relation, which relation is supposed to originate in some sort of precept, and to find its necessary expression in ritual act.

Sacrifice as we know it requires a material object. This object was usually a living creature, but not always, and it is now held by many that the idea of immolation or mactation is not of the essence of sacrifice itself. It is impossible to indicate here the various categories of sacrifice, but among these must be especially mentioned honorific and propitiatory. It is possible for the same sacrifice to belong to both of these classes. In any case the widespread character of sacrifice would appear to indicate that it corresponds to a felt need of human personality.

A word should here be added as to the special character of the sacrifices of the Old Testament. In these, two main elements may be distinguished: (1) The death of the victim, and (2) the offering to God of the body and blood of the victim, the latter (the blood) being regarded as its life. It should,

however, be carefully observed that only the second element was of a sacerdotal character, the slaughter of the victim being normally the work of the sacrificer.

With regard to the sacrifice of Our Lord upon the Cross, it would be reasonable to suppose that, as the final satisfaction of human need, it would contain within itself the various elements which appear to constitute the differing notions of sacrifice. It would thus be an instance of that "recapitulation" to which St. Paul alludes (*cf.* Eph. i. 10), and which is developed in the theology *e.g.* of Irenæus.

This, however, will become clearer if we attempt to apply to the sacrifice of the Cross a more developed notion than any of those yet mentioned. Thus it is possible, in synthesizing the ideas of sacrifice, to distinguish between sacrifice which is personal and direct and sacrifice which is ritual or symbolic. The only perfect example of the former will be found in the whole of Our Lord's earthly life, but supremely and particularly in His death upon the Cross; the latter is exemplified in what occurred at the Supper, and is sacramentally represented and continued in the Eucharist.

In the sacrifice of the Cross there was actual immolation, an element of sacrifice, but one which is not essential to its character. But just as it may be contended that Our Lord's sacrifice did not begin on the Cross, nor even at the Supper (as some theologians have held), but rather extended backward to the very beginning of His earthly life, so with the authority of Holy Scripture we may assert that His sacrifice is continued in the heavenly places. It is obvious that this heavenly sacrifice is itself dependent upon Calvary. Yet it is inconceivable that any idea of immolation should be connected with the Lord's high priestly activity in heaven. But it may truly be said that He there pleads His one oblation of Himself once offered on the altar of the Cross, "the eternal presentation of the life which eternally is the life that died" (Moberly).

It may then be suggested that this same idea should be applied to the eucharistic act, which externalizes in time and space the heavenly and eternal activity of our great High Priest. In the Eucharist there is, sacramentally, a ritual or symbolic representation of the historic fact of the immolation, upon which it is *ex hypothesi* necessarily dependent, for it is exactly in the Eucharist, as St. Paul teaches, that we are to proclaim the Lord's death until His coming again. In conformity with this idea is the teaching of the Church Catechism, which states that the Eucharist was ordained "for the continual remembrance of the sacrifice of the death of Christ," and adds, "and of the benefits which we receive thereby."

Thus it may be suggested that in the eucharistic sacrifice the sacrifice on the Cross receives a ritual or symbolic representation, while the offering of Our Lord in the heavenly places is so externalized under conditions of time and space that we are enabled not only to remember it, but to participate in the benefits which we receive thereby.

One point, however, must be added. Our Lord ordained that the sacrifice of Himself which He offered once for all upon the Cross, and after another manner continues to offer in Heaven, should be offered by His Church until His coming again, not as in any conceivable sense an addition to that which is complete and perfect in itself, but that, a perfect union between the Head and the members being effected, the heavenly and earthly action might be consummated into one. It is thus a veritable "eucharistia" in which Heaven and earth unite—"Therefore with Angels and Archangels . . . "; an "actio" begun at the moment of the Incarnation, completed on Calvary, continued alike in Heaven and on earth, itself a pledge and guarantee of that final consummation of perfect unity, perfect knowledge, and perfect life, to which the Church on earth must for ever look forward.

Various ideas of unacceptable character, which from time to time have found their expression in theories of the eucharistic sacrifice, are probably due to the fact that theologians have failed to realize that the eucharistic sacrifice is wholly of a sacramental character. If this point be clearly realized, it must for ever make impossible any theory of even a faintly realistic character. The Eucharist is the sacrament-sacrifice.

The definition of a sacrament with which we are most familiar is that it is "the outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace," and it is of the utmost importance that no theory of the eucharistic sacrifice should in any way "overthrow the nature of a sacrament" (Art. XXVIII.). This appears to be a main point of a recent work entitled *A Key to the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist*, by Dom Anscar Vonier. Understood sacramentally, any notion that that which is the kernel of the eucharistic sacrifice can in any circumstances be perceptible to the senses is finally excluded. The essence of the sacramental idea is effective symbolism, which is well expressed in the commonplace, "The sacraments effect that which they signify." If they fail to do this, they are not sacraments in the accepted sense of the word, but are merely didactic ceremonies.

It is impossible here to enter into the symbolism which constitutes the outward and visible sign of the eucharistic sacrifice. It should, however, be borne in mind that most theologians attach a great importance to the dual consecration

in relation to the immolation on Calvary, while the definite selection by Our Lord of bread and wine as symbols of His Body and Blood should not be dissociated from the fact that they symbolize the means by which material life is sustained. Also, at a very early date, they were regarded as symbolizing the unity of the Church through her scattered individual members, which by virtue of its offering and acceptance symbolizes its union with its Divine Head (*cf.* 1 Cor. x. 17, the Didache, Cyprian, etc.).

In conclusion, the following brief attempt to offer a synthetic explanation of the eucharistic rite, as known to us from the earliest times, in the various Liturgies may possibly do something to illustrate the suggestions made above.

In accordance with the Lord's command, bread, and wine mingled with water, are presented and set apart for sacred purposes at the Offertory. The bread, itself composed of grains of wheat originally scattered, and the wine pressed from many grapes, are themselves symbols of the Church dispersed throughout the world. The priest who offers or presents the gifts himself possesses representative character, so that his act of presentation becomes the act of the whole Church. There follows in due course the Consecration, extremely variable in form, yet on the whole capable of being traced back to something like a common origin, at any rate as far as ideas are concerned. This consecratory prayer contains, in brief, a narrative of the Institution, including the words uttered by Our Lord at the Supper. By the use of these words a covenant relation is established—the Church formally identifies her action with that of the Lord at the Supper. So far the human side.

The complement is the Divine action, symbolically set forth in very varying forms in the latter part of the Prayer of Consecration. The essence of the Divine action would appear to consist in the acceptance of the sacrifice, which henceforth is no longer that of the Church, but of Christ Himself. It may be said that the Lord does not add His sacrifice to that of the Church, but rather absorbs that of the Church into His own and identifies it therewith, so that the offering of the Church becomes the offering of Christ Himself.

Thus " after a spiritual and heavenly manner " the covenanted relation is fulfilled, and in Communion " the Body and Blood of Christ are verily and indeed taken and received by the faithful," resulting in that " strengthening and refreshing of our souls by the Body and Blood of Christ " which really and objectively fulfils the sacramental conditions.

N.B.—The following books, which have appeared compara-

tively recently, have been consulted in the preparation of this memorandum:

L'idée du Sacrifice de la Messe. M. Lepin. Paris, 1926.

Mysterium Fidei. M. de la Taille. Paris, 1924.

(A brief summary of the argument of this large work is given by the author in two papers contained in a book entitled *Catholic Faith in the Holy Eucharist,* Cambridge, 1923.)

A Key to the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist. Dom Anscar Vonier. London, 1925.

Sacrifice and Sacrament. E. O. James. London, 1927.

" Epistle to the Hebrews," in the *New Commentary.* S. C. Gayford. 1930.

H. Leonard Pass.

SOME FUNDAMENTALS AT EDINBURGH

When one is little better than a gate-crasher, it ill behoves one to criticize the fare provided. But these lines are not intended to be a criticism of the Edinburgh Conference, or if they appear to be so, may it be only as a friendly one. Nor, after all, were the Roman Catholic " observers " exactly gate-crashers: special provision had been made for them by the executive of the Continuation Committee, and, to enable them to enjoy the freedom of the Conference, the tactfulness of the Secretary dubbed them *Special Visitors* on their yellow identity labels, so that even the slight suspicion that might be aroused by the title *Observers* was thereby forestalled. In fact, everything was done to put them at their ease, and if they felt that the preliminary steps taken by them in approaching the Secretary savoured of gate-crashing, the welcome that they met with shewed that such an apprehension was unjustified, and must in the name of courtesy itself be finally laid aside.

A truer comparison, then, would be to say that they were invited to watch the play from the wings. Not exactly " behind the scenes," for that would suggest that there were things going on which needed hiding from the general public, but at least where they could watch the final preparations before the actors appeared on the stage. The " rehearsals," comprising the labours of the Continuation Committee, were of course, over, but its reports had been published, and there was therefore little difficulty in taking in the significance of the details as seen from a point of vantage in the wings. Indeed,

from there one saw more, perhaps, than many of the actors themselves, for the majority had not been present at the rehearsals, and some of these received quite big parts to play. So that the independent position of the " Observers " enabled them, perhaps, to notice " effects " or details which the actors missed, and one of them may be allowed now to call attention to some of the points which seem worthy of consideration by all who are interested in the movement. This selection of points must presuppose the general background of the Conference: they are rectifications or suggestions, not criticisms that would condemn the movement as a whole. Sufficient has already been published in praise of the spirit and of the achievements of the Conference to allow these to be taken for granted here.

I.—FAITH

Section I were able to congratulate themselves on having achieved complete agreement on the old battlefields of Grace, Justification, and Faith. How far this agreement was real one might hesitate to say. Some misunderstandings were indeed cleared up, yet not all misgivings were allayed, as was clear from the Orthodox Statement read towards the close of the Conference.

Only one point need be touched on here, bearing as it does on the Catholic Church's teaching on Faith.* There were in the sectional discussions some very vehement assertions made that Faith was not an intellectual acceptance of Revelation; it was a gift of God, and therefore could not be a mere intellectual assent. Of course, one knew that from the time of the Reformation the idea of " trust," *fiducia*, had swamped practically all other elements in the notion of " Faith," but it was difficult to see why an intellectual assent was incompatible with " a gift of God." It was only from private conversations that the reason for such an assertion was discovered. What the speakers understood by an " intellectual assent " was the assent given to a *conclusion* arrived at by *logical deduction*—and therefore essentially independent of God's activity in what we should call the supernatural sphere.

It would be difficult to say to how many the phrase " an intellectual assent " would necessarily suggest this. But as it is fundamental to the Catholic view of Faith that it *is* an intellectual assent, and as we are always insisting on the fact that our Faith is " reasonable," or " well-grounded," it may be

* The writer will be forgiven if, when he speaks of " the Catholic Church," he means the Church in visible communion with the See of Rome. Others use it nowadays in other senses; he begs to be allowed to remain old-fashioned.

useful to explain that the Catholic Church has never taught that Faith was the result of a strictly syllogistic process. It is true that two or three of her well-known theologians in the past tried to analyze it into a syllogism, yet even they always maintained that both the subjective assent and that to which assent was given had their origin in God's special supernatural intervention. This was most expressly affirmed by the Vatican Council, which dealt with the matter *ex professo*, and which thereby only gave authoritative expression to what had always been held.

That does not exclude—in fact, it makes possible the part of the will in the act of Faith. For if it were a logical conclusion, the will would have as little part in it as in any strict deduction. But if we insist that Faith must be " reasonable," it is because the will can, as we know only too well, attach itself to mere opinions in response to sentiment or whim in a way which is wholly *un*reasonable. The Church's insistence on the rational grounds presupposed by Faith guards against this danger. They make it possible for us to say that our Faith is reasonable in much the same sense that it is reasonable to believe a friend whom we can trust, when he tells us about something which we have not seen for ourselves. It is because we know we can trust God, and know that He has spoken to us through Jesus Christ, that we can say that it is *reasonable* to believe Him. But without the Revelation itself, and without a special clarifying of the mind and bracing of the will—all of which are gifts of God—we frankly admit that no amount of logical deduction or reasoning could bring even the most brilliant or earnest of students to a fruitful knowledge of what He that is " in the bosom of the Father " has declared of Him.

This insistence on the intellectual character of Faith, an intellectual grasp of truth revealed by God, must not be confused with the notion that no more is required for Justification —in whatever sense this word is taken. With Faith must go Hope and Charity, and what the present writer tentatively suggested to one of the Lutheran delegates—viz., that in their idea of Faith they rolled into one what we call Faith, Hope, and Charity—seems to be borne out by the definition, or rather description, of " Faith " given in the final Report:

" Faith is more than intellectual acceptance of the revelation in Jesus Christ; it is whole-hearted trust in God and His promises, and committal of ourselves to Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord."*

* The first words have an interesting history. The original *Report of Commission I.* had " Faith is *not only* belief in the Revelation in Jesus Christ. . . ." The Subsection's first draft, drawn up under strong Lutheran influence, ran: " Faith is *not*

Much more could be said about this rather comprehensive statement, nor does what has been said above pretend to be a full exposition of the Catholic doctrine of Faith. Its sole purpose has been to shew that even when Faith is taken to be an intellectual assent, the fact that it is a gift of God is not thereby excluded.

II.—CALVARY AND THE MASS

A misapprehension of a similar kind may be illustrated from a little incident which occurred in Section II. One of the first drafts had been distributed and was being read through, when a member rose to express with deep fervour his gratitude to God for the wonderful agreement to which the document testified. He pointed out as a special cause for gratification the agreement on the subject of the Redemption having been wrought once and for all by the death of Christ. This, he said, was one of the great principles which the Reformation had fought for, and it was a great triumph that all had now agreed to it.*

One could see what he meant, and no doubt many of those present agreed with him wholeheartedly. Probably the Orthodox were rather puzzled, for what a misconception of the nature of the Mass was involved in it! He obviously implied that Catholics believed that the Sacrifice on Calvary had not accomplished our Redemption, and that they thought that ceremonial rites, actions of their own, were efficacious improvements on the one Sacrifice of the Cross. How long will it take for the meaning, which Catholics attach to the Mass, to be generally recognized, if not as true, at least as not derogatory to the supreme efficacy of Calvary?

Briefly expressed, the sacrifice of the Mass combines two things: first it enables man to acknowledge God's sovereignty over him in a human way—*i.e.*, by using not only his mind and heart, but his bodily activities too. Who will say that the coming of Christ has *diminished* man's power to express his

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mere intellectual acceptance of . . ." A proposal to omit this phrase (as being purely negative), and to keep to the positive assertion that Faith was *fiducia*, led to a discussion in which the desire to preserve some place for intellectual assent prevailed. This was reinforced, when the draft came before the whole Section, by the change of "*mere*" into "*only*," which, by a return to the original wording, removed all doubt on the point. This form survived in both the drafts discussed in the full Sessions of the Conference, nor is it clear why it was changed in the final Report. Was it because "*more than*" could be taken to mean (if required) "other than"—*i.e.*, "*not*" (*e.g.*, "It is *more than* ginger-beer; it is champagne")?

* Subsequent drafting and various additions concerning Christ's "redeeming activity" had overlaid the original clear-cut statement by the time it reached the final Report.

dependence on God in the fullest way he can ? Or his need to do so ? This has always been done by the way of ritual sacrifice, and so long as man is clothed in flesh and blood, he will need to symbolize in word and action the interior worship of his soul. Secondly, the Mass is not a new sacrifice in the sense of being independent of the One Great Sacrifice. Rather it makes It present, its whole virtue and efficacy deriving from It. The Mass brings Calvary into our churches, spanning the centuries as the wireless spans the seas when it brings distant plays or concerts into our homes. Without the Cross the Mass would be as empty and dead as a wireless set when nothing was being broadcast. In a word, what Christ did once is brought home to us and works upon us, enabling us to share in that plenteous Redemption which He wrought for us, once, on Calvary.

III.—"GOD IS NOT BOUND BY HIS SACRAMENTS"

This was the formula which Section III. received from the preparatory Commission on *The Ministry and Sacraments*, and the final Report has an embellished version of the same: "God's gracious action is not limited by His Sacraments." This thoroughly Catholic expression had great influence in winning over those who, like the Society of Friends, have no Sacraments at all. But the formula in either of the above forms can cover more than one meaning, and, as far as the writer's observation went, these different meanings were not brought to the surface in the course of the discussions.

The Catholic meaning was sufficiently expressed in the contribution by Dr. M. J. Vetter, O.P., which the Commission had before them when they drew up their Report. "It is indeed possible for God to bestow His Grace even without the aid of any Sacrament. But *post Evangelium promulgatum* this is the *via extraordinaria salutis*. As *via ordinaria* God has given us the Sacraments through Christ." But even this, if read apart from other sections of the same contribution, might be interpreted in quite an un-Catholic sense. For if God can bestow His Grace even without the aid of any Sacrament, who will say that He does not do so at the appointment of a new minister in a Church which does not believe in a Sacrament of Orders ? And in that case, who will assert that the Lord's Supper celebrated by that minister differs in any essential way from the Mass offered by a duly ordained priest ? It was this difficulty which underlay the whole discussion on the burning question of the Ministry, and in particular the incoherent and inconclusive debate on validity. Until the question is

frankly faced, "Has God bound Himself *in any way* in the matter of the Sacraments?" the dispute will go on till the crack of doom.

How fundamental this is was brought home to the present writer during a conversation with one of the delegates. The latter could not conceive that anyone should hold that God might be tied down to some particular time and place, so that the divine liberty itself should be hampered. Put in that way one could appreciate his difficulty, and respect his desire to safeguard the utter liberty and independence of God. It was a difficulty, however, which surely never presents itself to anyone who has been brought up in the "sacramental system." But it may be one which is quite common among those whose devotion considers any exact definition of the Sacraments to be superfluous, as well as among those who reject the sacramental system altogether. A few words of explanation may be in place to shew that God's independence is not compromised and His love and condescension only enhanced by the Catholic doctrine of the Sacraments.

Precisely because of God's supreme independence, no man can tell intuitively what He will or what He will not do. It is only by considering what He has done that we can meet the complaint of our trying to "tie Him down to a particular time or place." To begin with, God chose to create the universe which we know; inasmuch as He might have created something quite different, He "tied Himself down" to this one. Inasmuch as He made *promises* to Abraham and a *Covenant* with the children of Israel, and even sent His Son to establish a *New Covenant* in His blood, He was displaying that supreme independence of His which, like the privilege enjoyed by every free will, expressed itself by freely binding itself for the good of those He loved. What makes the marriage vows so precious is not so much that one's partner is bound to one, as that he or she has *freely* chosen so to be bound. This is not the sacrifice of freedom, but its highest and noblest expression.

If then God has bound Himself by promises and covenants, if indeed He "tied Himself" to a particular Body and Soul in Palestine nineteen hundred years ago—*i.e.*, to a particular time and place—there is nothing in the notion of Sacraments which can be considered as a necessary derogation of His supreme independence. Quite the contrary. It would rather seem to be a derogation of His supreme independence if He *could not* choose to act in a certain way whenever they were performed according to His wishes, and if He *could not* bind Himself to do so by a self-imposed promise. Yet only so could one rule out the possibility of Sacraments as Catholics and many

others understand them—at least, on the grounds alleged. Indeed, on similar grounds, one would have to rule out the idea of God having bound Himself to words written down on His behalf in the most sacred of all books.

But just as God's special promises to Israel did not exclude His love and providence over the rest of mankind, so too the doctrine of the Sacraments does not exclude but always presupposes the direct action of the Holy Spirit upon the souls of men. Still, if that action also extends to those who have not the Sacraments which Christ instituted, it in no way detracts from that special manner of action which He has promised would attach to the use of the Sacraments.* This is not the place to justify each of the Sacraments nor to go into details, but a short exposition can be given of what are the principles involved and how Catholics look upon the whole matter. Others may consider them to be mistaken—at least they will know what is really held by them, and that is the first essential step to an understanding.

No Catholic should deny that in the rites of other religious bodies, whether sacramental or not, God bestows grace at His pleasure according to the dispositions of those who partake in them. God alone reads the heart, He wishes all men to be saved, He gives to all grace sufficient for salvation. But grace in this sense is one thing, the power to perform the rites which Christ instituted is another. In fact, the power to perform most of the Sacraments is itself conferred by a Sacrament apart. Supposing the Catholic view to be true that through the Sacrament of Orders alone can a person receive the power to confer any Sacrament,† then the dictum " God is not bound by His Sacraments " does not apply to the Sacrament of Orders. If it did, the very purpose of the Sacrament would be stultified. For its purpose is to secure to the Church which Christ founded that her ministers should be as recognizable as the bread and wine which are to be used for the Eucharist are recognizable. If Christ " tied Himself " to bread and wine in instituting this Sacrament, it was that He knew what was in man, and how much man needs something more than his own subjective assurance that all is well between him and God. As for the other Sacraments, so for the Eucharist, Christ instituted a recognizable sign which He promised to use in a special way

* Nor does it detract from the obligation to use the Sacraments once one realizes the meaning and purpose which Christ attached to them. They constitute, in Father Vetter's phrase, the *via ordinaria salutis*; and, corresponding to the question: " Has God bound Himself . . .? " one must not forget its counterpart: " Has God bound man . . .? "

† Except Baptism and Matrimony. Even here, their presence is necessary *normally*.

for the conferring of grace. *A priori* one could not perhaps say that He would do the same with regard to those who were to perform or administer the Sacraments. But to anyone who admits the Sacrament of Orders, whose function is to make those who administer the Sacraments recognizable as such, it must be clear that in instituting *this* Sacrament at least Christ bound Himself, freely and for the good of His Church, not to confer the same " powers " apart from it.

Unless, then, one is to abandon the Sacrament of Orders altogether, one must hold, as do the Orthodox and many Anglicans* as well as the Catholic Church, that, apart from Baptism and Matrimony, the rites performed by those who have not received the Sacrament of Orders do not call down that special intervention of God which Christ promised would be attached to the due performance of His Sacraments. God may indeed confer grace and help according to the dispositions of each, but that will not make those rites into the Sacraments which Christ gave to His Church. And in particular, any other rite appointing to the ministry will itself fail to confer those powers which Christ has bound Himself to confer only through His Sacrament of Orders.

Such is the key to the debate which raged about the question of validity in Section III. and in the full Sessions of the Conference afterwards.† The efforts to force the lock failed, and many may have thought that the prominent speaker was right who said that " he was convinced that the word ' validity ' was a work of the devil, thrown into the Church to cause us to make false and confused judgments." One is inclined rather to believe that many false and confused judgments, however well meant they were, might have been avoided if the true religious significance underlying the word had been clearly stated and adhered to.

IV.—COMPREHENSIVENESS, COMPROMISE, OR CAPITULATION

What has just been said leads naturally to a discussion of the end and purpose of the Movement as a whole. The French representative of the Youth Movement, who was permitted to address the Conference just before it broke up, said that one of the things which had most struck him was the doubt

* These do not, however, necessarily include even prominent members of the episcopal bench.

† It may not be superfluous to add that, wherever validity is in question, its presence or absence will depend on more than one condition being fulfilled. But the discussions referred to confined themselves, quite rightly, to the most important point at issue.

and uncertainty which prevailed as to the meaning of Œcumenism itself. We needed to be clear ourselves what we were working for, so that it might be put before the rank and file of the different Churches, for on their instruction and co-operation success must ultimately depend.

The uncertainty and vagueness as to the purpose of the Movement is, of course, a natural consequence of its very nature. The Conferences, which can, unfortunately, only meet at such long intervals, have as their chief task to find out and formulate what they are working for. Once that is settled, it is only a question of proclamation and persuasion, and of ways and means for the Churches to put the findings into execution. In the meantime all are groping to discover what the " Re-united Church " might be like in view of the present positions held by each.

At the same time, one wonders whether it might not have been useful if the fundamental issues had been more clearly expressed and realized. Why this horror of *definitions*, expressed more than once even from high places, whenever some knotty problem was approached ? Actually, whenever a speaker produced a clear definition in the middle of some dispute, or merely explained with lucidity the elements of the problem, his contribution was generally hailed with applause and was often incorporated in some form in the Report. Again, the work which the Americans, constituting Commission IV., produced in preparation for the Conference on the various aspects of Unity, received great praise for its painstaking analyses—and yet most of their work might be summed up as an effort to arrive at clear definitions. Still, the fact remains that definitions were decried in certain quarters, and the reason generally given was that definitions only cause divisions. This might be questioned even from an historical point of view. Was it the definitions of Nicæa which caused the Arian troubles ? Was it Ephesus and Chalcedon which caused Nestorianism and Monophytism ? Was it Trent that caused the Reformation ? The only apparent exception is that of the Vatican definition being the occasion of the Old Catholic separation. Even here the definition only revealed an existing divergence, it did not cause it. So that one can say in general that definition *follows after* dispute and division, and in fact has been a means of strengthening the unity which already existed, and of recalling to it those who were perplexed or hesitant.

But, quite apart from history, does not repudiation of definition in such a Movement come to this: " We mustn't know what we're deciding; if we did, we'd disagree "? If a happy formula is found, which one man can understand in one way,

another in another, can one say that they *agree* when they have both accepted it ?

To this it might be objected that, after all, exactly the same is to be found in the Catholic Church despite all her definitions. Councils were ever at pains to find formulæ which would not affect points which were "freely disputed in the Schools." But the difference lies in this, that the Councils were not deliberating on these points, but on what had been raised by "heretics." All were agreed on the exclusion of this, and their search for a formula was aimed at giving expression to the repudiation of the new doctrine without at the same time condemning what was considered to be an open question among Catholics. Thus has the Church excluded error without stifling the intellectual freedom of her children. Dominicans and Jesuits still differ in their explanations of the relation between the influence of Grace and the freedom of the will: they have always agreed in maintaining *both* God's supreme sovereignty *and* the freedom of the will itself.

On the other hand, we were asked by a certain group at the Conference to envisage a re-united Church in which the ministry should consist of "bishops, presbyters and deacons," but "no one dogmatic determination of doctrine" concerning it would be required.* What does this mean ? There are to be men who are named bishops, presbyters, and deacons respectively, but what those men are thereby empowered or not empowered to do must be left an open question. If you like to believe that they are of divine origin, well and good; if you think they are only human creations, you are free to do so. Is a bishop necessary for the ordination of a presbyter ? No one can question your right to deny it. And so on. There is no substance left about which there need be agreement, all is reduced to what may be termed a theological Nominalism. The idea may have been conceived in the spirit of charity, but, as one of the Orthodox members exclaimed in the course of the discussion, "Let us not introduce appeals to charity where the truth is in question." Nor were some of the Lutherans behindhand in repudiating such subjective conceptions. Perhaps some of those whom the proposal was specially intended to reconcile saw clearest of all: they feared that those who they were told need only be looked upon as bishops in name would soon turn out to be bishops in more than name.

* This seems to be qualified somewhat in the next sentence of the Report: "But all who value the 'historic Episcopate' (*i.e.*, the threefold ministry just referred to) hold that it should not be interpreted apart from its historical functions." But as it is precisely these historical functions and their nature which are so hotly disputed, what qualification is involved is obscure. One cannot deny that their "historical functions" had "one dogmatic determination."

If we leave aside such purely nominal agreement, three possible solutions seem to present themselves for the Unity which is the aim of the Movement: Comprehensiveness, Compromise, and what, for want of a better name, we may call Capitulation. At first sight, Comprehensiveness might seem to involve Compromise, and Compromise to be only useful in so far as it is comprehensive, but an interesting letter to the *Church Times* (October 29, 1937) assures us that this is not so. Speaking of the different Prayer Books, the writer says: " For all parties to be obliged to conform to exactly the same usage is mere *compromise*, and it is not always realized that *compromise* and *comprehensiveness* are diametrically opposite things. The former has had its day and has proved an unqualified failure. . . ." It is obvious that for the correspondent each should be left free to use whichever Prayer Book he prefers. To impose any one upon all would mean that the majority, perhaps, would be forced to make certain, at least mental, reservations with regard to parts of it. Let us apply this to the question of Reunion.

Comprehensiveness will mean that all retain what they now have. The object is to find a *Lowest Common Multiple*. If we take the prime numbers to represent particular doctrines or practices, and represent four groups proposing to unite by the doctrines and practices which they respectively hold, we can work out their L.C.M. as follows:

A 2.3.5. B 2.5.7. C 2.7.11.13 D 2.5.11.

The L.C.M. will then be 2.3.5.7.11.13. That is to say, the " Reunited Church " will have nothing new; it will accept all that any one of the parties now holds; each party will be at home because its own doctrines and practices are allowed for, even though no party finds them all in any of the others. The writer of the letter evidently considers that this pretty fairly represents the Church of England today.

Compromise, on the other hand, means sacrifice of some kind. It begins with the search for a *Highest Common Factor*. In the above instance the H.C.F. is 2, for that is the only point on which they all agree. But obviously they cannot content themselves with that.* Their Drafting Committee(!) will get to work and will then propose a formula: 2.5.7.11. That is clearly a compromise; A has to put up with 7 and 11; B with 11; C with 5; D with 7. On the other hand, B and D have all they want, and neither is A likely to press for 3, nor C for 13,

* During the Conference a remark was made that it was not very helpful to say that unity had been achieved because agreement had been reached on one or two points. One might as well state that we all say the Lord's Prayer, and leave it at that !

because they can find no support for them elsewhere. No one is entirely satisfied, yet for the sake of peace they may well accept it, as it is clear that it is the best that can be done.

Now if Comprehensiveness is carried out to its logical conclusion, nothing else can possibly emerge but a Federation of Churches, and it is difficult to see how such a Federation will help to solve the great problems which Reunion is intended to solve. Will the work of the Missions become any the easier because the different parties to the Federation can tell their neophytes that though in doctrine and practice there is a good deal of difference between them, yet at Headquarters they have agreed to mutual toleration? Will not each party continue to teach and train the new Christians in its own way, and forbid them to follow any other direction? Would not anything else be a compromise?

The Compromise policy has not this disadvantage—if it is loyally carried out. We must suppose this too to be pursued to its logical conclusion—*i.e.*, each one carrying out the *full* programme and adding nothing to it. This does provide the possibility of a real unity in doctrine and practice, and, in given conditions, of an Organic Unity. As an organic unity it could present a united front to the world both at home and in the mission field, and the disadvantages which we saw existed in Comprehensiveness would disappear. Shall we then opt for Compromise? Or shall we hesitate, in view of the fact that it "has had its day and has proved an unqualified failure"? For, when all is said and done, a compromise may indeed be the only peaceful solution where there is question of a *practical* course to be adopted, but where it is a question of *convictions*, the convictions will soon prevail over the compromise and the old differences reappear. In fact, if all the positions which revealed themselves at Edinburgh were put down in black and white, it would be obvious that in many cases no compromise was possible at all. What compromise could there be between the desire for a common basis of Faith and the opposition to any common creed being required? Between the necessity of episcopal ordination and the repudiation of sacred Orders? Between the belief that Christ is God and the belief that He might be anything less? One might lengthen the list considerably—but it would be painful to do so, and would be of no constructive value.

There remains, then, what was termed Capitulation. In spite of its forbidding aspect, it alone would appear able to secure that unity of mind which must be the basis of any effective Reunion. After all, every loyal compromise represents a capitulation on some point or other, a renunciation of what one

hitherto considered necessary, and Capitulation should appeal to that spirit of generosity and self-sacrifice which is presupposed in the members of the Œcumenical Movement, and which has indeed made it possible at all. Obviously, if all agreed to adopt the doctrines and practices of any one of the Churches represented at the Conference, died to themselves in order to find their life again in a real unity of mind and action, then we should have a united Church, unhampered by internal divisions to carry on its work both at home and abroad. But equally obvious is the fact that one would have to agree on the Church which was to be so privileged. If it were simply a question of unity at all costs, the solution is at hand: put all the names into a hat and let someone be blindfolded and make the draw. The patent absurdity of such a proceeding shews that it is not unity at all costs which is our object. And its absurdity is patent because fundamentally in the minds of all is the conviction that what we are looking for is not merely what will work, but what is *true*. If true, it is bound to "work," but its truth must come first.

Our problem therefore resolves itself into that of the quest for truth, and capitulation to truth may cost, but it is all gain. "Knowledge maketh a bloody entrance," but who will deny it is worth the cost? Of course, once one has made a discovery, one is no longer free to deny it. If one holds the truth, the truth has made one free—but not to hold the opposite. But what of our friends who do hold the opposite? Will not our impulse be to share the truth with them? If it is a fundamentally important truth, will we not be at pains to dissuade them from their error—just as we should try to dissuade a would-be suicide from his intention? The latter may be convinced that he is doing right, that he has a right to do away with himself: will that *make* it right? So too with truth; one's first task is to find the truth, but when found, nothing, no matter how sincerely and earnestly held by others, can make it anything other than the truth.

So much to take the sting out of Capitulation. It does not mean a blind surrender to the will of another, unless that other be God, who is the Truth Himself. But it may and in most cases must mean a surrender of hitherto passionately held convictions. That they have been passionately, even devoutly, held does not necessarily make them all true, and the first requisite for Reunion is the realization of this fact.

A second realization which must be reached depends on the nature of Religious Truth. The truths of science, the laws of nature, can all be studied in the laboratory of nature: facts are collated, hypotheses formed, laws gradually formulated.

We can find them out for ourselves. But what we mean by Religious Truth is what has come to us by God's Revelation: God, the transcendent, the eternal, *crashing into the world of space and time.* Here are truths for whose knowledge we rely on the word of God; most of them we could not otherwise have known. The question is, How do they reach us? Is it through our religious experience, or otherwise? Certainly each one's religious experience is the most intimate and the most searching of all his experiences; apart from it his life is religiously empty. But the point here is whether what is thereby conveyed to the mind is true or not. To say that it is the action of the Holy Spirit is not necessarily begging the question, but it does not provide an answer. One might indeed put the query how one is to know whether it is the action of the Holy Spirit, and not the projection of some purely natural yearning of the subconscious. But even if it be the action of the Holy Spirit, might it not be, to put it quite crudely, that He is making the best of a bad job? Or is one to suppose that He can do nothing with the misguided save force the *full* truth on them? Can He not perhaps use that part of truth and sincerity that is there to the benefit of him who prays, without necessarily correcting what is mistaken? In any case, it is only too patent that, even where the Bible is the common source of the religious experience, widely different convictions emerge, and as they contradict one another they cannot *all* be true. It seems to follow that if God has revealed to men something of His own life and of His dealings with mankind, some other means than religious experience must be found to distinguish what is true from what is false in it, and so to justify that capitulation to the one truth which alone can make men truly one.

In this connexion the function of the Church, as described in the Report, seems to provide us with an answer. "She is to . . . proclaim the good news to every creature and to make disciples of all nations, bringing Christ's commandments to communities as well as to individuals . . . and, through Christian education, to make them into convinced Christians conscious of the reality of salvation." To proclaim the good news she must know it; to make disciples, she must know what Christ's commandments are; to make convinced Christians, she must know what they must be convinced about. If she really knows, what she knows is the truth, and all should sit at her feet to learn. Capitulation to the truth, then, becomes acceptance of her teaching as the objective guide and control of our religious experience. Does this provide a solution to our difficulties?

Without attempting an answer, let us see exactly what is

involved in this supposition. " The Church " has as its function to educate even " those of her own fellowship "—therefore " the Church " here must mean not the whole of the " fellowship," but certain men who are responsible for what is taught. As it is a question not of what can be learnt from nature, but of truth come in from outside, it must mean that those who are so responsible are in some way privileged with regard to the truth which it is theirs to teach. That privilege must be God-given and recognized as God-given before anyone can be expected to " capitulate " to their teaching. Therefore there must be some practical way of recognizing those who are so privileged, and of determining when they are using their privilege. Again, they will obviously know of their privilege themselves, and part of their duty will be to make it known to others. So that the claim to be *the* teachers of Christianity, whose teaching must be accepted because it is the truth, is not only not a piece of arrogance, but a natural consequence of the idea of a Church which has as its function to make disciples and to teach them. Indeed, if we have excluded religious experience, there is no other way whereby the truths revealed in and by Jesus Christ can be certainly known by man today. On the other hand, Church officials of whatever kind who disclaim anything but the proposal of even most highly probable opinions cannot provide that objective guide and control of religious experience which we need in our search for the truth. We too have our own highly probable opinions; if others differ from us, we want to know which of us are right, which hold the truth ? Another highly probable opinion will not help us.

But since we are anxious to have the truth as it has come to the world through Christ, not even the religious experience of the most privileged teachers will satisfy us. It is *Christ's* teaching that we want and none other. Christ's teaching has been in the world now for centuries, and, whether written down in the Scriptures or passed first from mouth to mouth and only perhaps recorded later, it has been passing through men's minds, making them think and compare its various parts together, and weave into it whatever of the world's wisdom was not out of harmony with it. Such mental co-ordination of natural knowledge with the new God-given Truths brings out of these what at first was only there potentially. The athlete's torso is not something just added to the child's once tiny chest, it has grown out of it. So, too, if what Christ brought was living truth, it must perforce have grown, as, feeding men's minds, it was itself fed by them. Man must needs peer even into mysteries when they are given to him as truths, he must needs try to understand them better, see what they mean

to *him*.* Being truths, he will never exhaust them, but—what is here chiefly to the point—he may easily distort them, get them wrong perhaps in all sincerity, by introducing some unsuspected falsity, or emphasizing one truth at the expense of the rest.

What then is the very least that we have a right to expect from our privileged guides? It is surely that when we are following our natural bent for investigation, analysis and comparison of the truths which we have received, we should be warned when such and such an interpretation or application is a distortion of the truth: "Whatever it may mean—for no one can positively exhaust the meaning of a mystery—it does *not* mean that. You are quite free to investigate, define, co-ordinate, but *within these limits*; to the right as to the left lies falsehood." Their task is therefore to ensure that the development shall be on the right lines; not to limit the inexhaustible, but to save it from aberration. The child may not necessarily grow to be an athlete, but its chest must be protected against the cold.

Such seem to be the pre-requisites for arriving at Religious Truth such as the Christian Revelation is agreed by all to be. It must always be a receiving from the past of living, and therefore developing, truth. At no stage of the development must there be any contradiction of itself as it was at earlier stages, but this in no way hinders it from receiving an ever fuller and deeper meaning from century to century. And within the boundaries of error to right and left there can be a rich variety of meaning according to civilization, race or culture. These boundaries are made distinct by those who are privileged to preserve the Truth which Christ gave to the world. They must teach what they have received from those who preceded them, and save those whom they are teaching from misinterpreting it. With these pre-requisites, Capitulation is but the entry into the Freedom of the Children of God.

M. Bévenot, S.J.

TIME AND ETERNITY: A DEBATE

There are problems which take the form of a debate in one's mind. Such powerful support is available for each side that the whole question dramatizes itself in one's thoughts, and one becomes a mild type of dual personality, arguing now

* Incidentally this shews how the warning against the wish to define is, practically, a sort of obscurantism.

for and now against the motion. With sufficient imagination a third personality emerges to act as chairman, keeping order, summing up, reaching if possible a verdict.

The relation of Time to Eternity is a problem of this sort. The proposition may be stated in words of the late Bishop Masterman: "The great task for us nowadays is to think ourselves out of the temporal." They occurred in a brilliant address on the Victorian theologians given at St. Luke's, Exeter, a few years ago, and they were applauded. Within one listener their effect was to set up a hot discussion. One part of me joined in the applause, another part caused me to write a large question-mark in the margin of my notebook. And the debate continues.

The idealist within me proposes that "we ought to think ourselves out of the temporal." That is, we ought to relax our attention from the things that pass and concentrate upon the things that abide.

He would seem to have a simple task in commending this to any Christian audience, or indeed to any thinking person. Every philosopher, every poet, every lover, and every saint claims some acquaintance with a realm of being which is not subject to the clock or the calendar. It is to that realm that they address themselves in their highest moments of illumination. Its existence seems a necessity for our faith even if it were no part of our experience; for without it thought would have no starting-point, morals no standard, and the sense of beauty no ideal. It has been held that our perception of the most prosaic objects—a cow, a turnip, or a stone—conveys the same belief. For we are aware of them as enduring objects, although in the time-process they are nothing of the sort. An ink-pot in ordinary space-time is a dance of electrons; it is only that, and it is nothing more. And yet by some principle of unity enabling it to transcend the flux of events it offers itself to our attention as an ink-pot. This is a modern simplification of Plato, who to prove his point had to posit an ideal ink-pot behind the one which we touch and see. We can now accept his point without the aid of this unverifiable assumption. The ink-pot before our eyes is enough to establish the realm of being above the realm of transience. It is not strictly true that change and decay in all around I see. If I could only see process I should see nothing.

Along these lines we are led to attach a meaning to the word Eternity. By this word we shall not understand an infinitely extended time, but a condition different from and superior to the condition of successiveness. And so we think of Almighty God as one to whom is present the whole of reality without

those conventional labels Past, Present, and Future which we have to use. Even we are not entirely dependent upon these labels. Even for us the tyranny of the clock is not quite absolute. What we call the present moment always, in experience, contains a generous slice of the past. For example, when a goal is scored at a football match the roar of the crowd is a tribute to the whole movement which enabled the shot to be made. And we can, without absurdity, claim also that even the shape of things to come has a moulding influence upon the present moment. To take another illustration from sport, the novice at golf is often puzzled by his teacher's insistence on the importance of following through with the club-head after striking the ball. He naturally asks what difference can be made to the flight of the ball by any movement of the club after the ball is struck. The answer is that the ball can only be correctly struck by a movement which will end in a follow-through. At the moment of impact the golfer is engaged in an action comprehending past, present, and future. And we could trace innumerable other instances in which our present actions and decisions take toll of the future. "Our deeds still travel with us from afar, and what we *shall be* makes us what we are." In brief, our experience is never genuinely instantaneous. It spreads along the time-dimension, like a spot of wet ink upon a thread of cotton, in both directions.

Once this is recognized, it is but a step to the admission that God is entirely free where we are partially emancipated; that the divine awareness is subject to no time-table at all. As the mystic Tauler has written: "In that eternal Now where God essentially exists is neither past nor future. There the beginning and end of all time are present at hand. There, to wit, in God, all lost things are found; more things than man can ever lose." Human philosophy on the whole has come to recognize this as its sheet-anchor. Bertrand Russell, a philosopher of our time who would, I think, disclaim to be called an idealist, says: "A certain emancipation from time is essential to philosophical thought; both in thought and feeling, to realize the unimportance of time is the gate of wisdom." Lord Russell is not a theist, neither is he disposed to look beyond the phenomenal world for his picture of reality. He is well acquainted with the latest movements of thought, springing from the concepts of Evolution and Vitalism and tending to place a far greater importance upon Time and Process than could Plato or the writer of the Fourth Gospel or all the mystics. Yet he refuses to follow in the wake of the moderns, and declares that we cannot attach real value to Time without losing something

essential. The non-successional view of Eternity has established its claim to be called the Perennial Philosophy.

The satisfaction which it offers is not limited to the professional philosopher. The ordinary person finds that the major crises of life and the greater achievements of the human spirit have a curiously timeless character. There are moments which enfold eternity, moments of ecstasy or anguish or of serene reflection, when the clock seems not so much to stand still as to be irrelevant. It does not matter whether time passes or not; we are in a realm where time does not count. As I write there is a play on the London stage, Priestley's *Time and the Conways*, which has this for its sole point. It shews a family spending a delightful evening planning a happy and prosperous future. Then it shews that same family years later, plunged in various kinds of misery and failure. Then in the third act it reverts to the original scene and moment, and the rosy future is still being joyfully discussed. The point is that the joy of that evening, having been a real experience, is an eternal possession.

Such a play would not be filling the house nightly if the central idea did not strike some chord in the average person. Neither should we see anything but absurdity in certain great poetic statements. Shakespeare says of Cleopatra: "Age cannot wither her nor custom stale her infinite variety." Keats, of the nightingale: "Thou wast not born for death, immortal bird. No hungry generations tread thee down." Walter Pater of the Monna Lisa: "She is older than the rocks among which she sits." On their face value these statements could be mildly described as Mark Twain described the reports of his death; they are gross exaggerations. Yet that is not quite how we receive them. On the contrary, we quote them with pleasure as though they scored points in our eternal duel against Time. There is much significance in the colloquial question, "How's the enemy?" In English hymnody Time is an ever-rolling stream. In Chinese mythology Time is an ever-devouring dragon. Both images represent it as something hostile, something beyond the reach of which we would fain set the things dear to us, if we could. And it seems that we can. The idealism of Plato, Christianized through St. John and St. Augustine, and centuries of poetry and mystical experience, offers us the satisfaction of seeing through the illusion of time. Time has some power to frighten, but none to injure. "Nothing that really *is*," says Plotinus, "can ever cease to be."

An elderly poet was once taking a schoolboy around his garden and deploring the regrettable habit which the carnations and roses had of fading. "But they only fade in time, not

really," said the boy, to his own surprise and confusion. He walked down the path with his elderly companion, hot with discomfort at having said anything so foolish. At the end of the garden the poet broke the silence. "Yes, of course," he said, "I was forgetting that."

To think ourselves out of the temporal is to turn our backs on illusion and seek reality. It is to behold the King in His beauty and the land of far distances. It offers victory over sorrow and freedom from the corrosion of anxiety. "All happiness and unhappiness," writes Spinoza, "depends on the nature of the object on which we fix our affections. For except on account of that which is the object of love no contentions arise: no sorrow if it perishes; no envy if it is possessed by another; no fear, no hatred, no disturbance of mind, all of which feelings are continually stirred up in us by the love of those things which perish, such as wealth, honour, and pleasure. But love to that which is eternal and infinite feeds the soul with unmingled joy, untainted by any sorrow. This, therefore, ought we to desire and seek after with all our powers."

Thus far the idealist side of me. Meanwhile my tame realist has been listening with growing impatience. It is the first time that he has had to wait so long to put in his spoke. This perhaps accounts for the tinge of sarcasm in his opening remarks.

He congratulates his friend upon having expounded a point of view which offers many advantages, including one which has not been mentioned. This view would dispense its holder from answering any letters or keeping any engagements. For if the eternal world be genuinely eternal and unruffled by the passage of time, then it cannot ultimately matter what use we make of time. Tomorrow at seven-thirty I have to be at the altar of my church, according to present arrangements. But if I prefer to stay in bed it can only cause temporal inconvenience to those who happen to come to church, and the eternal verities remain unaffected. Even the annoyance of the other people only arises from their failure to recognize the illusory character of time, in which error it would be wrong of me to encourage them.

And this is no mere debating point. In actual practice it does seem that the habit of contemplating the eternal world results in some indifference to what is going on in the world of action and change. Platonism, in such urgent times as these, must take the appearance of being mere escapism. To give a small example. I have been tempted, in the writing of this paper, to neglect duties which were really much more

imperative. But what is it that makes any duty imperative? Is it not the conviction that present actions have enduring results? But to believe this is to believe that events in time can seriously affect the eternal order. In fact, it is to look at the universe of reality in an entirely different way, not as a realm of Being to be contemplated, but as a realm of Ends to be achieved and demanding time, perhaps endless time, for their achievement.

Matthew Arnold said that conduct was three-fourths of religion. If it were only one-millionth of religion we should have to attach a more than symbolic value to Time, for conduct good or bad takes time. At eight o'clock a man signs the pledge. At eight-thirty he is outside his favourite public house, battling with the familiar craving. His eyes are drawn by the saloon lights, his fingers nervously turn over the copy of the pledge in his pocket. Will he go in or will he go home? Remove the clock from that situation and you remove the situation with it; there is no moral drama present unless we are acutely conscious of the time element.

An ardent platonist like Dean Inge does not shrink from deducing a non-moral Heaven. His intellectual honesty is nowhere more prominent than on such a question. Naturally he strives to find some way of attributing moral values to the eternal world, but he does not burke the issue. He admits that the moral will requires time in which to energize, and concludes that it is doubtful whether the moral will is active at all in eternity "except as creating moral values in a lower sphere." But he is not easy in mind about this, and adds: "Whether the eternal mode can really be deflected by happenings in time is a question I shall not attempt to answer. The philosophical difficulties in the way of an affirmative answer are great, but Christians always have believed that in the personal life the consequences of right and wrong action on earth are decisive for the conduct of souls in eternity. It will be seen," he winds up, "that I end this chapter on a note of indecision."

His hesitation marks the acuteness of the dilemma. How can we believe that souls are lost and saved in the temporal order, and also believe that the eternal order is not subject to the passage of time? This is the crux between Christian platonism and Christian ethics.

To think ourselves out of the temporal, then, would seem to threaten our grasp of the importance of behaviour. But it would threaten much more than that; for instance, the savour of the interest of life, and especially of the arts, would seem to evaporate. Consider such a purely spiritual thing as music,

and how essential to it is the temporal framework. Or consider drama and its need of time. Shakespeare, we know, had his platonic moments. Usually he is the practical dramatist, revelling in the bustle of events and clash of character, moving from scene to scene, building up his scenes to their climax. But often, as he watches the play of character upon circumstance and circumstance on character, he is drawn into comments which may be philosophically sublime, but are dramatically fatal.

In *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Theseus courteously apologizes to his guests for the poorness of the play they are watching with the words: "The best in this kind are but shadows." And we feel that Shakespeare himself is afflicted with some doubt as to the worthwhileness of his trade. The same thought keeps cropping up in other plays: "We are such stuff as dreams are made on, and our little life is rounded with a sleep."

> "Tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow,
> Creeps in this petty pace from day to day;
> To the last syllable of recorded time.
> And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
> The way to dusty death."

These are among his grandest and most quoted lines, and yet if we assent to them we are left wondering what is the good of all the trouble taken to act, either on the stage of the theatre or on the stage of life. Fortunately for his fame, Shakespeare was only a platonist in patches. Falstaff is not such stuff as dreams are made on!

It will be seen that this disconcerting effect of the platonic view not only applies to human action and human interest; it affects most intimately our mental picture of God Himself. Do we think of God as one who is, or as one who acts? There may seem at first no difficulty in combining the two ideas. The average person is one who is and one who acts. But, then, the average person is not a perfect being. Perfect being seems to preclude action, for action is change, and perfection needs no change. The point has been very thoroughly treated by Dean W. R. Matthews (*God in Christian Thought and Experience*, chap. v.), but we will choose a quotation from another book to make it clear: "The difference is sharp between the static Absolute of much European thought and the dynamically active Deity of Hebrew and Christian belief. It is the difference between Fact and Activity, between Being and Life, between the Absolute that merely exists and the God who is self-revealed as an eternally creative Energy. The one type of doctrine issues in a mysticism transcending time and change, the other points to a religious interpretation of

events" (*Le Réalisme Chrétien et l'Idéalisme Grec*, Laberthonnière).

This difficulty was, of course, felt from the beginning of philosophic thought about God, and Aristotle forestalled it by defining God as "Actus Purus"—a pregnant phrase which may solve the problem for us, or may, on the other hand, seem a distilled paradox combining two incompatibles.

The conception of God as active is fundamental for Christians. It is prior to any other conception. The Bible begins with the fiat of Creation and ends with a plea for yet another supreme and decisive divine action: "Even so, come, Lord Jesus!" Between these two poles comes the story of Redemption, a story of masterful intervention on the part of God in earthly affairs. "The waves of the sea are mighty, and rage horribly, but the Lord who sitteth on high is mightier." Even when God defines Himself to Moses as "I Am that I Am"—a definition which would excite the attention of any platonist—it is a prelude to His act of wrenching Israel from the clenched fist of Pharaoh. The Bible is too full and various to suffer generalization, but if we were asked what is the most prominent element in it we might reply the divine dictatorship. "God is working His purpose out as year succeeds to year." To think ourselves out of the temporal, even if it be possible, would be to place ourselves superior to such temporal happenings as the Creation, the giving of the Law, the birth and crucifixion of our Lord, and His Resurrection, the commission of the disciples, and all that the Church has ever done. Can we really suppose that these events have set up no ripple upon the crystal sea before the eternal throne? That they are not events at all in any ultimate sense, but only symbolic pictures of what was and is abidingly true?

The Christian Creed is largely a series of historical statements, and consistently with this view of the importance of what happens in time it proceeds to deal with eternal life in temporal terms: "And I believe in the life of the world to come." Where Plato would bid us look up, the Creed bids us look ahead. It frankly offers life in Heaven or Hell as following life on earth. Is this mere picture language, suited to children who do not comprehend the real nature of eternity?

Thus far the realist, and he has one more shot in his locker. He asks, What happens to the Time-process when it departs? At present it is in full swing. The sun is setting, clocks are ticking, I am talking; and we agree that none of these things is interminable. But according to the platonic view Time itself will have an end, to which we could provisionally fix a date. Let us suppose it to end at midday on the sixth of

June, A.D. 10,000. Is it possible to picture this final event without going on to wonder what will happen on the afternoon of that day? Can you imagine a final "tick" without a subsequent "tock"? This question is, I know, philosophically crude. Professor Eddington would tell me I am confusing time as measured with time as experienced; but I should deny the charge. If time is there to be experienced it is there to be measured; and even those experiences of which it is claimed that they have a timeless quality do, in fact, take time to be felt at all.

If the late Bishop Masterman had asked me to think myself out of the *spatial* I could have obliged him. I can easily believe that space is a passing mode of thought suitable to our present condition. Space is our mental framework in which we locate and observe objects; it is the realm of *things*, and things as things may have no ultimate importance and perhaps are not "really real." But time is the realm of *events*, and events are inextricably bound up with the realities of character and personality. To think ourselves out of the temporal is to think ourselves out of the realm of action, aspiration, and affection into some block universe where nothing is done, nothing is wanted, nothing is felt, but where existence merely exists.

The chairman in me, whom in virtue of his office I will designate by the first person singular, begins with a mild complaint that the Idealist has been so contemptuous of time, and the Realist has proved so fond of it, that little of this commodity is left for summing up. However, this does not matter much, for I agree heartily with nearly everything that has been said on both sides.

The philosophic mind hates a dilemma as much as Nature hates a vacuum, but (like Nature) sometimes has to put up with what it hates. In the present case, however glaring may be the apparent contradiction between the two views of Eternity, we simply cannot afford to deny ourselves the truth which is offered by each of them. The genuinely truth-seeking mind will not make a fetish of consistency. Whatever fills the mind with conviction will be accepted, and if it appears to conflict with something already accepted for the same reason, it is not irrational to accept both and to hold in suspense the problem of how to reconcile them. It is well known that the scientists of the present day follow this practice. Some of their investigations convince them that the ultimate unit of matter is a particle; others, that it is a wave-motion in the medium which fills all space. These two conceptions are fantastically different from each other, and yet it has been said that modern science works on one assumption on Mondays,

Wednesdays, and Fridays, and on the other on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. Each conception is too fruitful to be scrapped at the bidding of the other.

Neither is it necessary to despair of reaching a conception which will unite the two. Hegel has taught us, when faced with a thesis and an antithesis, to look for a synthesis. It is true that this method was invented and intended for the interpretation of history, but it is available for other departments of thought, provided always that a genuine synthesis makes its appearance. We shall merely note that the synthesis will always be of an unexpected character and will generally involve conceptions not previously entertained, for it undertakes to reconcile seeming contraries.

The two views of eternity which we have considered may be set in opposition in two sentences: (1) The passage of time is of no ultimate importance; (2) the passage of time is of supreme ultimate importance. A reconciliation of these statements might seem so remote that only a deep conviction that each is somehow true would set one looking for it. Yet I believe that a thinker of our own generation has provided the clue to the ancient dilemma—namely, Mr. J. W. Dunne, whose book, *An Adventure in Time*, was first published in 1927. I mention the date because, although the book attracted very great attention at the time and a cheap edition was published in 1934, his idea has not yet been given the serious attention which it claims. Many considerable volumes of religious philosophy have been published in these ten years, and most of them confess that the problem of Time is the crux of modern thought, but so far as my reading goes few of them make much reference to Mr. Dunne's book or examine very closely his strange suggestions about the nature of Time.

He is the only writer known to me, ancient or modern, who on the basis of his philosophy could cheerfully and consistently affirm both of the two statements which I have just put in opposition to each other. The only thing that *can* allow these statements both to be true is the attaching of two different meanings to the word "time." Until Dunne wrote his book it does not seem to have occurred to anyone to ask whether there may be more than one sort of time. And yet, as he points out (and this is one of the fascinating curiosities of his theory), we all habitually use the word in two senses without realizing it.

We say that "Time flies," and it seems a perfectly simple sentence calling up a clear image. There is a bird on the wing, which we call Time. It passes in a straight line over field and hedge: seven hedges to a week, three hundred and sixty-five hedges to a year, seventy times this to a lifetime. That

appears a satisfying picture. But here Dunne intervenes with an objection: "What is all this about seven hedges to a week, and so on? I thought you said time was a bird which flew. I didn't hear you say it was a hedge which stood still!" But we object: "Anything that flies must fly over something. If we had nothing by which to measure its movement we should not be aware that it moved." "Precisely," he replies, "and that something over which it flies is that length of days, weeks, years, which you call Time. You are using the word in two different senses without realizing it."

Dunne does not actually use these words or this particular illustration. It is merely my attempt to compress that part of his argument which hints at a solution of our dilemma. Any real attempt to employ his theory as peace-maker between the two schools of thought would require a much longer essay than this, and it would require a competent philosopher to do it. I cannot help thinking that the attempt will be made, for at present even our leading thinkers seem to be conspicuously hesitant when they come to this subject, for lack of some such clue. On the one hand we have already seen Dean Inge ending his argument from the platonic side on a note of indecision. On the other hand we have such a leading realist as Archbishop Temple (*Nature, Man and God*, p. 447) asking whether history makes any difference to the eternal, and replying that in one sense it does and in another sense it manifestly does not. I purposely choose the greatest names, those which in this sphere command our reverence. There is an unbridged gap between them, across which Mr. J. W. Dunne is capable, I believe, of at least throwing a rope.

But these heights and this task are not for me. I welcome this prospect of reconciliation, but apart from it I should be content to hold both views, even if they had to be segregated in different parts of one's brain.

Christianity cannot scrap platonism. That enduring background to the changes and chances of this mortal life is essential if thought is to be clear, feeling deep and pure, or the will firm. Without it, we should build our house of life on sand. Even Hebraism, with its God of theophanies and battles and interventions, derived all its strength from its grasp of an immutable perfection beyond the realm of change. "See that thou make all things according to the pattern shewn thee in the mount."

And, on the other hand, we cannot loose our hold on that faith in historic process which assures us that events count; that the cup of cold water given to the thirsty is noted in Heaven; and that Heaven itself is a scene not only of contemplation, but of service.

E. C. MORTIMER.

MISCELLANEA

A COMMUNICANT'S MANUAL OF 1830

The difference between Churchmanship before the Oxford Movement and after its influence had been felt is often so much exaggerated that a glance at a Manual published by the S.P.C.K. may be of interest. It is called *A Companion to the Altar: showing the Nature and Necessity of a Sacramental Preparation, in order to our Worthy Receiving the Holy Communion*, and the copy used is dated 1830. It is longer than most manuals in use today. Great stress is laid on preparation, which is based on the last answer of the Catechism. The teaching is thoroughly sacramental. " The sacrament of the Lord's supper is not a converting, but a confirming ordinance, intended to preserve and increase that spiritual *life and grace* which we received at our baptism. . . . As our natural bodies are fed and nourished with those elements of bread and wine, the same effect is wrought in the soul. . . . Thus our souls, by this sacrament, are fortified and strengthened with grace, wisdom, courage, and all other spiritual gifts." " Frequent communion is of great advantage . . . it is the likeliest method to make our bodies the temple of the Holy Ghost, and to prepare our souls for the enjoyment of God to all eternity."

The writer grapples with the difficulty caused by the words " eating and drinking our own damnation." Those who never partake of the body and blood of Christ " are in equal danger with those who eat and drink unworthily; nay, I might say in greater, because the latter use the means in obedience to our Saviour's command. . . . The surest way, I say, to prevent their damnation, is, to receive the sacrament more frequently than men usually do." Monthly Communion is urged; also fervent prayer, and meditation following on Bible reading. Reading gives spiritual food, which is digested in meditation.

The prayers to be used at home are, to our thinking, too much concerned with sinfulness and not enough with positive ideals of saintliness. The forms of self-examination are very like those in use today, except that " Sabbath " comes under the Fourth Commandment where we say " Sunday."

The prayers recommended at the service are short. There is one " at going up to the Altar," another " when you retire from the Altar." Lengthy prayers are provided for use when others communicate, proving that the numbers were generally large.

Does the Manual teach the Real Presence? it may be asked. The answer is that it is so absorbed in the reality of the Gift that the question in its post-Tractarian form would not arise. The grave defect of the teaching lies in the complete neglect of the corporate nature of the Eucharistic action, a defect shared with many Manuals still in use.

Two final observations: the title-page bears the legend " adapted to the Use of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge," which suggests that an existing Manual was toned down. At that time no publication was approved until it had been passed by a General Meeting

of members; the sacramental teaching must therefore have been representative of the Church of England. Further, the recommendation of monthly Communion shews that facilities for frequent Communion must have been far more common than is generally believed.

W. K. L. C.

" GREATER THAN HE "

" Among them that are born of women there hath not risen a greater than John the Baptist: notwithstanding he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he " (Matt. xi. 11; *cf.* Luke vii. 28).

All the modern commentaries that I have read agree that this text is a prophecy of the greater privileges awaiting baptized Christians however insignificant—greater than had been awarded to the greatest of the Jews. They further agree that there is no more to be said.

That it is such a prophecy is undoubtedly true. That there is no more to be said—there is much more that *has* been said! But since it seems to have been forgotten, I would set forth somewhat thereof.

St. Thomas Aquinas has written (*Summa* i. 108, ii. ad 3), " Inferior angelus est superior supremo homine nostrae hierarchiae, secundum illud (Matth. xi. 11): *Qui minor est in regno coelorum, major est illo*, scilicet Joanne Baptista, *quo nullus major inter natos mulierum surrexit.*"

This passage comes in a discussion of the " wonderful order " of the angelic hierarchies, which St. Thomas would rank above " our hierarchy " of bishops, priests and deacons. But he ranks St. John Baptist here above even the greatest of the ecclesiastical hierarchy—the apostles themselves, those " princes of the Church."

Now I cannot help thinking that St. Thomas' interpretation of the text under consideration is the literal, primary interpretation; and that the " prophetic " interpretation set forth in modern commentaries is but a secondary, derived meaning, concerning but the kingdom of grace, not of glory. Was it not our own Hooker who repeated earlier authorities in insisting that Scripture interpretation must first of all give the literal meaning ?

At the time our Lord spoke the words of this text, the kingdom of heaven was " at hand," embodied in His own Person. But there were as yet no baptized Christians numbered among the subjects of that kingdom. Our Lord's subjects in the kingdom of heaven were the angels, and the angels alone. By the common consent of Christendom, the apostles or princes of the Church are acclaimed pre-eminent in that phase of the kingdom of heaven which is the Catholic Church—two human beings only ranking above them, apart from our Lord, namely the Blessed Virgin and St. John Baptist. Our Lord spoke of those already born into the world. The apostles were already born at the time He spoke. That Blessed Mary does not come into the picture is due, of course, to the impossibility of her rank in the wonderful order being determined while the implications of the Incarnation were not yet thought out in the Church.

Christendom agrees that she ranks above the highest of the angels. Every Christian Liturgy honours St. John Baptist by ranking his Nativity among the Great Festivals. The Roman Missal indicates these things in the Confiteor exactly. " Confiteor Deo omnipotenti, beatae Mariae

semper Virgini, beato Michaeli Archangelo, beato Joanni Baptistae, sanctis Apostolis Petro et Paulo, omnibus Sanctis, et vobis, fratres."

It is much to be wished that modern commentaries would correct the misunderstandings arising from forgetfulness of the literal meaning of this text, which is reinforced by *Lex orandi* of all the liturgies including our own. People say, as it was recently said to me, " Why make all this fuss about St. John Baptist on June 24th, since the least Christian is greater than he ?" They hear sermons whose teaching is derived from modern commentaries, but is opposed to liturgical practice.

H. H. Firkins, S.S.M.

" THE UNIVERSAL PRAYER OF CHRISTIANS FOR UNITY "

By l'Abbé P. Couturier

(*Translated Extracts.*)

" . . . It is the property of love to produce a blind confidence in the one who is loved. My confidence is in Thee, limitlessly and justifiably since Thou art the All-Powerful. It launches me into Thy Heart where I find Thy prayer: ' Father, that they all may be one that the world may know that Thou hast sent Me. . . .' My sinner's prayer is Thine own prayer, and in Thy prayer is my sole peace. When ? How is this Unity to be accomplished ? What are the obstacles to be overcome ? That is Thy affair; my faith cannot constrain me to anything more than to pray with Thee, in Thee, that Thy Unity may come, that Unity which Thou hast never ceased to desire, to pursue, which Thou preparest, which Thou wouldst have realized long since if all and myself, had been crystal clear in that which from the Creation through the Christian wanted to rise to Thee, and in that which from Thee, still by him, wished to descend upon the world."

This formula of prayer is simple, loyal. It is a point of convergence, where, under the seal of charity, there can flow together into the Heart of Christ all the prayers for unity of all true sons of Love, of all true Christians even although they are separated. Surely, in fact, this manner of prayer does not cancel, attenuate, confound in any way the numerous dogmatic differences which mark the separations. Each one experiences this and knows it perfectly well. This is why each one remains true to himself and sincere with others. Simply, with a great flight of wings, this prayer flies beyond all bounds and makes us all rest together in the heart of our Christ.

It is in no way necessary (and it would even be very harmful and ruinous because ritual confusion is already a step towards religious indifferentism) that this point of convergence should take visible body in an assembly of crowds of diverse Christians gathered to share officially or otherwise in the same religious ceremonies. In the complete separation of different churches, in the full independence of their beliefs, rites, spiritual outlooks, separated Christians amongst themselves will make rise from their heart the same cry, that very one uttered to the Father by their Christ before going to His Passion, just as they will do it also in their private prayer.

. . . The internal exigencies of faith in Christ and of life in Him imperiously require from each and every Christian, whatsoever may be

his Christian " confession," one prayer which by this fact will become universal, one prayer whose form will find its model in the prayer of Christ for unity, on the evening of the Last Supper. In the stream of days, this universal prayer will flow, diffuse, throughout the entire Christian body. God alone will hear its uninterrupted secret murmur amongst souls, fraternities, and cloisters. But confined only to the cloisters by habit and by the tumult of multiple preoccupations this half-silent melody of prayers is in very strong danger of growing dull, of breaking off, of suffocating itself in indifference and oblivion. Now, to be efficacious and to obtain the coming of " the providential day " it must spread swell until it becomes the immense unanimous clamour of the whole' Christian people. Then, *not before*, Christ will be favourably heard by the Father, because only then will be sensibly expressed the prayer of the *total* Christ, the Christ risen and living in the souls of all loyal, sincere, true children of the Father. Here we are at a fresh stage: such a result can only be obtained if this universal, here-below independent but in God converging, prayer of separated Christians experiences visible pulsations, simultaneous and periodical. At least once in each year there ought to be a great tangible intercession of all the children of Israel, a true " revival " of prayer, a true rekindling of the continuous melody.

Other reasons also require this visible and periodic simultaneity.

Since all Christians are, more or less, responsible for the actual state of a disunited Christendom, there ought before God publicly offended and before men justly scandalized, and before the whole creation visible and invisible in relations mysterious and real with Christians vitally bound together in Christ, creation slowed down in its becoming fully consummated in Christ by the weight of Christian disruption, there must necessarily be a collective (corporate) reparation, simultaneous, visible, as far as ever possible. From this simultaneity will come the benefit, not of adding to but of multiplying the forces of reparation and intercession. It is because it is interwoven that " the three-stranded cord is with difficulty broken." Over against the ugliness of their separations, this simultaneity will enable Christians to offer to their non-Christian brethren and to all creation, the moving and visible beauty of their spiritual efforts, prelude and pledge of Christian unity, that beauty transcending all harmonization of merely human efforts.

It remains well established, beyond all controversy, that this simultaneity of which we have been speaking has nothing to do with inter-confessionalism. It is entirely in a different domain, *toto coelo*, of the " multiconfessional." In nothing is it, in the ordinary sense of the word, a collaboration. It must be said of it and of all this form of prayer of which we have been speaking that it is a *parallelaboration*. These two neologisms ought to become current language, expressive as they are in their fresh brevity, not yet staled, precise and clear in sense.

Who will not now see the root problem emerging. If the unity of Christians depends on true prayer, then humble, heartfelt confession within a penitential context, it follows that each one is faced with the question of personal sanctification, but a sanctification which is orientated. It follows from this that the Christian's prayer has unifying power in proportion as he, himself, is nearer to God, that is to say more stripped of self. *It is not sufficient for this to affirm that one possesses the truth.* . . .

Now, the organic life of the Mystical Body (which embraces the Invisible Church of those baptized by desire explicit or implicit) produces

in this world, in and by Christ, an intercommunication of souls. This real supernatural intercourse has as its natural channel the real interlinking of all men amongst themselves, from the very fact that they are all personalized bodies from a single and immense seed, or individuals, constituted as persons, of the immense human species. Even the dull aspirations towards repentance, the deficiencies to be repaired, the cries which from the depths are thrown up to Christ by criminal souls by their very crimes (false quests after happiness), the exultations of thankfulness, the sweet joy of purified souls, the entire interior life of all men impinges upon my own spiritual life. In my prayer flows vitally their prayer. I have only to let it flow, to say, Yes. And in order to do better, this better whither we must always tend, I have only to realize, that is to say to reflect upon in the innermost heart, all this flux which passes into me and mounts to God when I pray, to render more alive, in striking it with my moral personality, this current towards God coming from the farthest depths of humanity. [At this point a *footnote*: The intuition of Claudel has penetrated far into these depths of the Mystical Body of Christ and has sung them in his Song of Palmyra. " . . . None of my brothers, when he wishes but is capable of failing us, and in the stoniest miser, at the centre of the prostitute and of the most bestial drunkard, there is an immortal soul which is holily occupied in breathing and which, debarred from the day, practises nocturnal adoration. I hear those who speak when we speak and who weep when I put myself on my knees. I accept all. I cover them all, I understand them all, there is not a single one of whom I have not need and of whom I would be capable of doing without . . . there are a number of souls, but there is not a single one with whom I am not in communion by this sacred spark in them which says, Our Father."] Reciprocally, I pray then in each of the others. My prayer for Unity rises from my heart, and by the spiritual circulation of the Mystical Body filters through the prayer of my Brother, perhaps far estranged from me by the content of his beliefs. But if he is nearer God than I, it is in his prayer that my poor prayer will find its best efficacy, its most rapid flight towards the Eternal. What marvels are hidden from our poor fleshly eyes with regard to the spirit.

One ought not to say: I pray for such an one; I pray for another, unknown. Nor ought one to say: I pray on behalf of such an one; I pray on behalf of another, unknown. But it behoves to say: I leave that other to pray in me, I open to him with love the road of my soul; may he be very free in the way of my prayer: the life of prayer. So at the altar of the Holy Mass, at the choral Office, at silent prayer, with me and in me pray my Protestant brethren, Anglicans and Orthodox. And just the same I am, I pass: in the loyal, sincere prayer of the divine Liturgy and Offices of convinced Orthodox, in the public and private prayer of fervent Anglicans, in the fervent Protestant commemorations of the Last Supper. . . .

CORRESPONDENCE

" THE ŒCUMENICAL MOVEMENT."

DEAR SIR,

Father Hebert's valuable account of Congar's *Chrétiens désunis* seems to me to draw a false contrast between the Church of Rome on the one hand and what it is now the fashion to call the " Œcumenical

Movement" on the other. It pictures the Church of Rome as able to contribute "a positive doctrine of the visible unity of the Church" based on "the Biblical idea of the One mystical Body," and contrasts "œcumenism" with this as essaying a humanistic attempt to create a unified Body out of the many divided Christian bodies.

For this latter judgment reference is made to passages from a speech by the Bishop of Gloucester at Lausanne in 1927. I am not sure that the Bishop would accept the inference drawn from the words quoted as accurately representing his thought; I am quite sure that anyone who has kept in close touch with the development of "œcumenism" in the last ten years would know that the picture here given is false. That the Church is one because it is the earthly body of the one undivided and indivisible Christ; that the present divisions between Churches are fissures of varying depth which do not necessarily penetrate to this underlying unity; that the task of the œcumenical movement is to find the way to the full expression of this already existing unity in our church life—these are the convictions which move the movement, often openly expressed, perpetually working as a leaven in the minds of those engaged in the work. Witness the increasing use of the phrase "the Una Sancta" as an international term appropriated to the expression of this doctrine.

The difference between the Church of Rome and the "Œcumenical" Churches lies in the different answers they give to the question: "Which of the various Christian communions does the risen Christ Himself recognize as constituting His earthly body in its outward manifestation?" The "Œcumenical" Churches believe that He recognizes a larger number than does the Church of Rome, and that He wills us in consequence to work for the expression of this fact in a restored fullness of Christian fellowship. Both at Oxford and at Edinburgh many people were perhaps surprised to find how much of the discussion implied as common ground this positive doctrine of church unity based on the Biblical idea of the One mystical Body.

I do not wish here to say anything on the merits of the issues involved in the differences between the Church of Rome and the "Œcumenical" Churches. My purpose in writing is simply to point out that as a matter of fact it is a mistake to identify these, either in respect of the doctrine of the Church or otherwise, with the contrast between adherents of Divine Revelation and advocates of humanistic Liberalism.

Yours faithfully,

LEONARD HODGSON.

"THE MATTHEAN EXCEPTION"

SIR,

In his note on the Matthean "exception" in the November issue of THEOLOGY Mr. Taylor falls into a serious, though not uncommon, error when he states that it is "the official view of all Christendom that marriage without it (*sc.* consummation) is null." This is certainly not the view of Western Catholicism.

From the early centuries onwards, except for a period of doubt between the tenth and twelfth centuries, the Roman Church has held to and acted on the principle that *matrimonium non facit coitus sed voluntas.* Under the present Roman Canon Law an unconsummated marriage can

be dissolved (*not* nullified) by dispensation from the Apostolic See "for a just cause," but it is in itself as true a marriage as any other.

The proved fact of impotence at the time of marriage has, of course, always been accepted as an impediment diriment, and refusal by one party to consummate has sometimes been taken in English law cases as evidence of such impotence (and has now in the recent Matrimonial Causes Act been made part of English law), but this is obviously quite a different matter.

Yours truly,
FREDERICK TINNEVELLY.

"SEX AND MARRIAGE"

DEAR SIR,

In reply to Canon Newbolt's criticism of my remarks, I beg to say that I was not contending that marriage cannot be valid, except between virgins. What I do contend is that marriage between virgins is the ideal set by Christ. I am well aware that there are bound to be what he calls "imperfect" marriages, though I should prefer to call them inferior types of marriage, the children of which are bound to be regarded as legitimate. Nor do I "equate sex-intercourse with marriage." I was drawing attention to the truth that it is a basic factor, referred to by Christ in such a way as to appear the basic factor. His statement ought not to be overlooked in any Christian discussion of marriage. The result of its being ignored is seen in the way in which men have wandered into positions quite different to His. Such is that taken up by Canon Newbolt when he says "cohabitation is a use or operation of marriage." That makes it a secondary detail, whereas Christ makes it fundamental by referring the whole question back to the initial act by which God created the sex-relation. If I omitted to mention the factor mentioned by Canon Newbolt, "the intention of the persons to enter by solemn contract into the state of marriage as it has always been understood," or another factor to which he does not allude, the consent of society to the particular wedding, I did as our Lord did in the passage in question, though that does not imply, as Canon Newbolt says it does, that they are "left out of account."

It is not difficult to discern historical causes which have led to the failure to consider "they twain shall be one flesh." But it has led to some strange exegesis, or rather avoidance of exegesis. For example, Armitage Robinson in his Ephesians describes the words "and they twain shall be one flesh" as enigmatic.* The careful and comprehensive article on the history of the treatment of the "Exception" in the last THEOLOGY shews, by implication, how even that clause has habitually been interpreted without reference to the basic principle of our Lord. And, as far as I can make out the meaning of Canon Newbolt's sentence, "marriage, as our Lord declares, was not newly instituted by Him, but was 'from the beginning,'" it not only suggests that He is appealing to the practice of the human race from the beginning, but ignores the vital point that the condition is of God's creation. To turn the text into a protest against His being supposed to claim to be the founder of matrimony is, indeed, a strange piece of exegesis.

Canon Newbolt says that my treatment "would reduce holy matri-

* In the article on the meaning of μυστήριον in the New Testament, p. 239, ed. 1914.

mony to a state which could be defined in terms of biology and psychology alone." This is not quite so crushing as it sounds. Surely psychology is the study of the mental life. Biology and psychology, mind and body, means the whole man. Does St. Paul, in basing his argument against fornication on the very dictum* on which I rely, put himself out of court by reducing the sin " to a state which could be defined in terms of biology and psychology alone "?

But the trouble resultant on our avoidance of the topic has had wider effects. We have—unintentionally—countenanced, by our silence, the common belief that the sexual act is merely a physical incident. Where we say nothing, people naturally assume that we have nothing more to say. Thus, untold harm is done by such partial statements as Canon Newbolt's, " a man who marries a woman with whom he has already had intercourse enters on a new and honourable relation." This would be construed by many, as a variant of " If they get married, it will be all right."

Instead of following Christ's reference, we have tried to answer questions by referring people to the sacredness of the family, or of vows, or to the action of officials. These are all weighty matters. But we have no right to use them instead of, and to the suppression of, our Lord's treatment of the subject. Along with this, we have allowed the discussion to be confined to the question of Divorce, apart from that of fornication. This is most unfortunate, as marital infidelity is largely due to the existence, not to say prevalence, of sexual licence before marriage. If we had used the maxim, as we should, we should have cut at the root of the tree. And we should be better prepared to reason with those brought up outside the Christian tradition, in this country, who honestly ask what is the ground of our objection to fornication.

Furthermore, we are trying to persuade ourselves that all the marriages celebrated by the Church, so long as we cut out the marriage of divorced persons, are marriages which conform to our Lord's ideal. It is not true. There are, as every priest knows to his sorrow, those which do not. There are not only the marriages of loose persons, but of those who do not, and even those who will not, marry until a child is certain to be born. On account of " the hardness of their hearts," we not only tolerate and perform, but also try to stabilize such marriages. We can do no other. But it means that, even now, we allow persons to communicate at our altars who do not conform to Christ's ideal of marriage. And, whether we refuse to consider any further application of " because of the hardness of your hearts," or not, our refusal, if it be such, cannot be based on the assumption that the present practice of the Church of England, even where its rules are strictest, represents an insistence on Christ's ideal of marriage.

R. O. P. Taylor.

NOTES ON PERIODICALS

Analecta Bollandiana. Tomus LV., Fasc. III. et IV.

This number of the Analecta contains the Greek version, now published for the first time, of St. Theodote of Nicea. " A superficial reading," writes the author of the article, " is sufficient to class it without possible

* 1 Cor. vi. 16: Know ye not that he that is joined to a harlot is one body ? for, the twain, saith he, shall become one flesh.

hesitation in the class of fabulous martyrdoms, of which we have given elsewhere numerous examples." In this number also is printed the catalogue of the Latin hagiographic codices in the Libraries of Paderborn and Osnaburgh, which may be of service to the student. The most interesting article is, perhaps, one which contains together with much introductory matter a sermon by Rupert of Deutz in commemoration of that mysterious saint Pantaleon, who has no church dedicated in his honour in England, though the canon's vestry in Chichester Cathedral has always been known as the Chapel of St. Pantaleon. Why? And why were Pantaloons named after him? Unfortunately neither Rupert of Deutz nor the writer throw any light on the problem. The longest article in the number is entitled *Gloria Postuma* St. Martini Turonensis, Apud Scottos et Britannos, which is replete with learning and throws much light on the state of the Church in Britain in its pre-Augustine stage. The article as a whole will repay study. C. P. S. C.

REVIEW

THE WISDOM OF GOD: A BRIEF SUMMARY OF SOPHIOLOGY. By Sergius Bulgakov. Williams and Norgate. 6s.

The Russian Academy in Paris trains young men for the priesthood with a view to their ministering to their fellow-exiles from Russia. But it has other functions also. It is a centre of Russian theological thought and study, at a time when most of such centres have been destroyed and there are few remaining. From it flows a stream of theological writing by men of ascetic life and often of great ability. Thus the Academy is an outpost in the West of Russian Orthodox theological learning, in close contact with the Western world. Members of its faculty contribute to religious periodicals which are published in Western Europe, and in other ways also bring the religious thought of the Russian people into touch with the West. All of which is very much to the good. Professor Bulgakov is alive to the importance of this aspect of the work of the Academy, of which he is the Dean. In his introduction to *The Wisdom of God* he points out with some justice that we in the West are very ignorant of Russian religious thought; though perhaps it is hardly fair to imply that we also despise it. At any rate this book, he says, has been specially compiled for the Western reader with the secret hope of arousing his interest in Sophiology and urging him to become acquainted with the main works bearing on the subject (p. 27). (In view of this hope, by the way, it would have been well to include other works beside Bulgakov's own in the bibliography at the end of the book.) Professor Bulgakov has many friends in this country, who, both from reading what he has written and from talking with him, know him to be a man of intellectual power and of a very real and deep spirituality. They in particular will turn with interest to *The Wisdom of God*, which is a summary of the writer's more extended expositions of Sophiology, and especially of the triology beginning with *The Lamb of God* (1933) and *The Comforter* (1936), the third part being not yet published. There is a very interesting and readable introduction, in the course of which no small claims are made for Sophiology. It is the solution of the problem of overcoming the cleavage between religion and the world (p. 32); it is the means of understanding the dogmatic problems of the Church, no single one of which does not stand in need of reinterpretation today (p. 35); it is the path to Christian

Reunion (p. 37): in fact "the future of living Christianity rests with the sophianic interpretation of the world and of its destiny" (p. 39).

The chapters which follow expound the doctrine of Sophia in relation to the Holy Trinity, the Created World, the Incarnation, Pentecost, the Blessed Virgin (a chapter which accounts for the enormous stress Bulgakov always lays upon the veneration of Our Lady) and the Church. Without attempting to summarize the intricate and fine-spun reasoning of these chapters, it is enough to say that the effect upon the reader is likely to be both startling and disappointing. The writer is frequently suggestive and stimulating, but is uncomfortable with the knowledge of how easily he may be misinterpreted. He appears to follow his speculations until he finds himself on the brink of heresy and then to pull himself up with an assertion of his orthodoxy on the point in question. In general one is left with two enquiries in one's mind. What is the basis of all this? Bulgakov cites Holy Scripture, but all of it—Chronicles, Proverbs, the Gospels or Epistles—apparently as of equal value and authority. Occasionally he appeals to the Eastern Orthodox liturgical texts and to the evidence of ikons, but much of it seems to be individual speculation. The reader has little sense of the compelling force of objective truth. And, secondly, supposing it is all true, in what way does it tend to establish the high claims made for the practical and spiritual value of Sophiology in the introduction?

Whatever Bulgakov writes is sure to be examined with respect, and no doubt this book will be widely read. Every book which helps to make the Russian theological tradition better understood in the Anglican Communion is to be warmly welcomed. But the value of *The Wisdom of God* for that purpose is discounted by the fact that its subject is a matter of acute controversy within the Russian Orthodox Church itself. Bulgakov himself, one gathers, would not claim that it represents the main stream of Russian Orthodox theological thought.

R. M. French.

NOTICES

Handbuch zum Alten Testament: Daniel. By A. Bentzen. Tübingen. J. C. B. Mohr. M. 2.60.

Daniel is one of the superb books of the Bible. It is not "true" in the prosaic sense of the word, but it is an accurate transcription of the emotions of God's people during the Maccabæan crisis. It uses old material, of Iranian and Babylonian origin, which by a wonderful alchemy it transmutes into something so rich that the Messianic hope, the assurance of immortality, even the religious experience of the Lord Jesus, are for ever expressed thereby. In the height of war fever the author's heart is not restrained; the heathen persecutor, though punished, is converted.

Professor Bentzen in fifty closely-packed pages gives all that is necessary to give us the key to the understanding of this great document, always cool and learned, always alive to religious values. As so often in reading German commentaries, one says: For this alone it is worth learning German.

W. K. Lowther Clarke.

Religious Life in Seventeenth-Century Scotland. By G. D. Henderson, D.D., D.Litt. Cambridge University Press. 15s.

This learned and important work consists very largely of reprints from various theological journals. They were well worth collecting into one volume, though the result is naturally slightly disconnected. The most interesting chapter to an Anglican who might be unfamiliar with the facts, and certainly the most distressing, is that on Externals . . . under Charles II. Bishop Rattray's description of an Episcopalian service of that date is the most vivid reminder that these services only differed from those under the jurisdiction of the Presbytery in the use of the Doxology and the Lord's Prayer. The most painful part of Rattray's description is charitably omitted. To this day the general repetition of the Lord's Prayer is considered in old-fashioned Presbyterian circles to be a mark of "Episcopalianizing tendencies." ("You must blame the Lord for that, not me," said a minister recently, when taken to task for the innovation.) But as Dr. Henderson points out, the distaste for these liturgical forms is no part of original Presbyterianism. The disuse of them was the work of Cromwell and the Westminster Assembly. It was only the fact that it was in 1661 that they were restored which gave the impression that they had something to do with Episcopacy.

The volume is full of hard facts about an immense number of people, very fully documented, and perhaps rather difficult to assimilate. But the author ought not to have said that James I.-VI. was in England "officially the Head of the Church." He must be aware that no Sovereign since Mary I. has borne this title.

Kenneth Brechin.

The Prophetic Road to God. By T. H. Sutcliffe. S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d.

Mr. Sutcliffe writes with sanity and with sobriety. He has lectured to Church tutorial classes in Lancashire, and this book is the outcome of his lectures. The questions at the end of this unpretending book attest how practical the nature of this teaching has been, and we can readily believe that those who are engaged in the task of explaining the mission of the prophets of old will find in this suggestive piece of work idea after idea capable of being set forth to classes such as those, we are sure, the author held with such success. We tested his book by his account of the two Isaiahs. The first he regards from the angle of the Messiah and the thought of holiness, the second from the angle of the missionary labour of Israel and the suffering of the servant of Jehovah.

R. H. Murray.

Preparation for Confirmation. By a Committee of the Church of England Advisory Board for Moral Welfare Work. S.P.C.K. 1s. 6d.

Good as the whole book is, the best of it is the part concerned with special reference to the place of sex in Christian life. The spiritual aspect of sex receives careful handling, and we do not wonder that the Bishops of Blackburn and Kingston write a Foreword to one of the sanest books on Confirmation that has come our way. R. H. Murray.

The Axiochus on Death and Immortality: A Platonic Dialogue. Edited with Introduction and Notes by E. H. Blakeney, M.A. Frederick Muller. 5s.

The *Axiochus*, a brief dialogue falsely attributed to Plato, which has long remained neglected, is now given the honour of careful editing and handsome printing. So slight a work, as Mr. Blakeney observes, does not require an elaborate commentary; his admirable translation and brief notes will satisfy the needs of most readers. On the question of date and authorship Mr. Blakeney does not say much, and probably there is not much to be said. He is inclined to date the dialogue earlier than some scholars, and suggests that it may have been written soon after the death of Epicurus as a protest against his teachings. Certainly it is not very Platonic or Socratic, in spite of the deliberate antiquarianism of the setting. The author's object is the same as that of Epicurus, to combat the fear of death, a task which he approaches with less consistency than Epicurus, but more imagination. M. L. Clarke.

The Riddle of the World. By D. S. Cairns, D.D., Principal of Christ's College, Aberdeen. S.C.M. Press. 8s. 6d.

While Cambridge is busy erecting new buildings, and Oxford is busy shewing that if she cannot construct as much, she can at least demolish more, the Scottish Universities are still defending the ancient citadels of thought.

Principal Cairns has written a book whose clear thinking and plain

speaking will make many of his Student Christian readers feel (as it did me) what woolly-minded Sassenachs we are. If the answer to the riddle of the world is ever discovered (and I hope it will not be finally settled in my time), Scotland will be its provenance; unless, of course, one of the Scots who fill most of the professorial chairs in England finds it out for us.

The danger, however, does not seem to be that the fortress of Christian thought will fall, and that theologians will be put to flight, but that a secular-minded public will not trouble to attack it. If St. Thomas Aquinas at a modern dinner table, after half an hour of silent thinking, exclaimed, " *That* disposes of the Manichees!" the company would languidly ask, " Manny Who ?" with minds running on boxers. The man who imagines that Sodom and Gomorrah are man and wife; the honeymoon couple at Oberammergau who, after enquiring of each other what the Passion Play was about, came to the conclusion that it must be something to do with the Bible; the young lady (I vouch for her authenticity) who never could remember whether Easter came before or after Good Friday, are not likely to be seriously concerned whether Christianity is credible or not, though, odd as it may seem, they are passionately interested in rival theories of government, besides giving to science all the reverence of which their souls are capable.

Principal Cairns is quite aware of all this. The opening chapters, on " The Human Situation and Humanism," lead up to an admirable discussion of Science and Religion. He explains what scientific thinking *is*, and for what reasons Science does not, and never can, have the last word on ultimate Reality.

In speaking of the Moral Pathway to Reality and of Natural Theology he is much kinder than some theologians are to the findings of reason unaided by Revelation. In the chapter on " Providentialism " he neatly disposes of Julian Huxley's notion that a belief in Providence makes us all ethically lazy. (This scientist's book, *Religion without Revelation*—an oddly emotional and impulsive work of art, not to be taken seriously as a contribution to thought—seems, by the way, to have caused Principal Cairns some heartaches, for he refers to it sadly no less than twenty times.)

The author is very happy when he begins to praise Revelation and to set before us the Hebrew solution of this world's problems. He does not believe that we can dispense with any of the " great constructive principles " of Old Testament thought, though the light from the New must be allowed to play upon them. For instance (p. 291), he says, when discussing the problem of war, the " prophetic " answer would have been: " There is no problem; the real mystery would have been if such sin had *not* worked our death."

Principal Cairns evidently holds (and here his younger readers will almost certainly follow him) that both Old and New Testament give justification for belief in a Kingdom of Heaven set up on earth, and a this-world triumph of good over evil.

Members of S.C.M. are, we suppose, Christian already, and will agree with the forcible summing-up, " the substance of the Faith," contained in Chapter XI.

But what of non-Christian students—these Humanists, Naturalists, and so forth whose defences are so completely demolished—will anyone persuade them to read Dr. Cairns ? The objection to him is that he is

an expert in theology and philosophy. The intelligentsia of today does not ask its doctors to invest its money, nor its stockbrokers to give it medical advice, but it insists that its scientists should provide its religion. Nothing less than a Ph.D in astro-physics will qualify anyone to solve the riddle of the world. (But possibly Principal Cairns *is* thus qualified. In which case all is well.) ÆLFRIDA TILLYARD.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT. By L. S. Thornton, C.R. The Unicorn Press. 3s. 6d.

There are few doctrines more misunderstood than that of the Atonement, and few in which misunderstanding is more fatal. Christianity has been repeatedly attacked for its supposed teaching of the significance of the Death on the Cross from the days of St. Paul to those of Shelley, who called it a " strange sacrifice " to save a few souls while millions went to " the gaping grave " because they had not heard of it; of Tom Paine, who thought it made God " a passionate man who killed his son when he could not revenge himself in any other way "; of Mr. Bernard Shaw, who considers that it deals with an " insane vengeance and a trumpery expiation," and an " attempt to cheat God and get to heaven without paying the price "; of Mrs. Besant, who rejected it as " contradicting the justice of God in accepting a vicarious suffering from Christ and a vicarious righteousness from the sinner "; of writers who think that it means that " God had to have His Son murdered so as to make His created puppets at one with Him." And it is today one of the stock objections of the Secularist speaker. We were glad, therefore, to see the subject treated by a theologian and are sure that every reader of *The Incarnate Lord* will welcome another work from the pen of Fr. Thornton. He is not an easy writer to read, but then his subject is not an easy one to write on or one that we can expect to understand without taking trouble. He, perhaps wisely, confines himself mainly to the Scriptural ground, which must be the reference for all Christian theology if only because Christianity is a religion based on historical facts. This he does in chapters on God and Man, the Moral and Historical Dilemmas, the Promised Saviour, Redemption from Sin, the Sufficient Sacrifice, Expiation for Sin, and Atonement in the Church. " No attempt," he says, " is made to provide a ' philosophy ' of the Atonement or to construct a new ' theory.' "

We hope that he, and those who use this book, as it will be used, as a mine of matter for sermons, will go on to consider the various theories of the Atonement held and disputed in the various ages of the Church, getting clear how they arose, how far they are based on the facts, and why we must reject popular perversions of the truth, while avoiding the wordiness and ambiguity that so often misleads people and presents a target for Rationalistic attack. C. F. ROGERS.

LES URSULINES. Par Marguerite Aron. B. Grasset, Paris, 1937. Pp. x+254. 18 francs.

The new volume devoted to the Ursulines in the series " Les Grands Ordres Monastiques et Instituts Religieux " is a well written, if sometimes rather rhetorical, little book which, while not pretending in any

sense to be a complete account, succeeds in conveying an admirable impression of the ethos of a teaching order. Its development during four centuries is no less remarkable than the claim which the writer feels able to make in a striking and only too short chapter entitled " L'Essor Missionaire " that " l'Ordre des Ursulines a l'honneur d'avoir donné à la chrétienté la première femme missionnaire, et missionnaire éducatrice." The claim which is made for Marie de l'Incarnation, an Ursuline of the monastery of Tours, is in connection with her work as foundress of the monastery of Quebec in 1639, and when the writer says that the true title of her book should be " Essai sur l'histoire passée et la vocation présente des Ursulines " it is with a thought of obligations of which the fulfilment has been sought in many lands. The little book succeeds in finding space for details of method and even hours of courses, and rightly insists upon the care that is exercised to secure provision for the future work of the Order. One delightful paragraph may be quoted out of many: " Les Ursulines ont commencé d'établir, dans chacune de leurs provinces, des maisons d'études où leurs juvénistes vont, à leur sortie du novitiat, parfaire leur formation technique. Mais déjà leurs Supérieures ont discerné en elles leurs aptitudes particulières; elles les ont encouragées; au besoin signalées à d'autres maisons en vue de l'avenir. . . . Les Supérieures ont-elles cette compétence ? Oui, elles s'étudient à l'avoir. Elles ont l'ordre de se garder du temps pour étudier elles-mêmes, suivre leurs étudiantes ou, mieux, les précéder. *La formation des chefs, c'est un des premiers soucis des Ursulines.*"

CLAUDE JENKINS.

THE TREATISE ON THE APOSTOLIC TRADITION OF ST. HIPPOLYTUS OF ROME. Edited by the Rev. Gregory Dix. S.P.C.K. 12s. 6d.

The writer accepts the now generally-received thesis reached independently by Professor Schwartz (1910) and Dom Connolly (1916), and founded on the newly-discovered *Verona Latin Fragments* published by E. Hauler. The original Greek is lost, but Connolly judges that the *Latin Fragments* have the appearance of being a very literal version of the Greek (*So-Called Egyptian Church Order*, p. 5).

This discovery throws much new light on the Church history of the beginning of the third century in Rome, and enables us to trace back many customs a great deal further than was formerly possible. Much that was written about the Church Orders two decades ago needs reconsideration, especially about dates. In particular, those paragraphs in Bishop Lightfoot's elaborate essay on Hippolytus, which deal with the *Apostolic Tradition* (*Clement of Rome*, ii. 400 *ff.*) need rehandling, and that eminent scholar would have been the first to admit new light on the subject. This new light we now have. Dom Dix's work has the great value of giving us the exact words of the Latin fragments, with readings both of the Oriental versions and also of the Church Orders which are largely dependent on Hippolytus (these are two quite different things). We also have a literal translation in English of the *Tradition*. Connolly had given us the Latin, where extant, and an English translation of the Oriental versions where the Latin is wanting; Dr. Easton (1934) had given us an English translation of the *Tradition*. Our present writer shews his extensive reading. In his Introduction he gives a rose-coloured

view of Pope Callistus, the opponent of Hippolytus, and a very unfavourable view of Hippolytus the theologian. For our present purpose what concerns us most is the information about Roman customs described by Hippolytus, who was (as both Easton and Dix justly remark) of a conservative turn of mind, and not an innovator on such subjects. We may gather that the customs described in the *Tradition* are of an even earlier age than the beginning of the third century, when Hippolytus wrote.

The See of Hippolytus must remain an enigma. He says that he was a bishop, but even Eusebius and Jerome, who wrote some 80 to 120 years after his death, did not know where it was. The later suggestion of Bostra in Arabia was due to a misreading of Eusebius (Lightfoot, p. 428). Other later authorities named Portus, at the mouth of the Tiber. Or he might have been a bishop without a See. Dom Dix accepts without question Döllinger's view that Hippolytus was the first antipope. This view has to meet the objection that he did not claim to be Bishop *of Rome*, and that in none of the lists of the Popes dating from the third, fourth, and fifth centuries is there a hint of Hippolytus as an antipope (Lightfoot, p. 431).

We miss much through lacunæ in the Latin fragments, but where the Oriental versions and the Latin substantially agree we may be fairly sure that we have the original words of Hippolytus. The independent Church Orders (like the *Apostolic Church Order*, the *Apostolic Constitutions*, and the *Testament of our Lord*), which depend much on the *Tradition*, may sometimes suggest the true wording of Hippolytus's original Greek; but these must be received with some caution. Of Dom Dix's emendations of the Latin text many are probable; a few, to say the least, are uncertain. Among these last is the suggestion that the simple Epiclesis of the Holy Spirit in the Latin (as it is in the Ethiopic version), being without the explicit petition for a change in the elements, as in most of the later Church Orders, is probably not Hippolytean. The only real argument for this suggestion is that the *Testament of our Lord* (written a century and a half or more after the *Tradition*), after inserting long paragraphs which are mainly different from the *Tradition* between the Sursum Corda and the Anamnesis, gives, instead of an Epiclesis of the Holy Spirit, a long Epiclesis of the Holy Trinity (this reminds us of Irenæus' language) asking that the communicants may be filled with the Holy Spirit. There seems to be no good reason for this suggestion. The only deduction we can make from the whole evidence is that the Epiclesis of the Holy Spirit was not universal till the latter part of the fourth century.

With regard to Hippolytus's title, it should be noted that his work has not the "apostolic fiction" which appears in so many of the Church Orders, like the *Apostolic Constitutions*; the title expresses what its author believed to have been handed down to his day from the time of the Apostles.

A. J. Maclean.

Christian Ethics and Social Health. By H. P. Newsholme, M.D. The Unicorn Press. 3s. 6d.

The author of this little book compels admiration for the comprehensive way in which he has treated a very difficult subject. He realizes fully that health is wholeness of the entire personality, and is to be

found in the right relationship of the individual with God and the community quite as much as through scientific knowledge and physical care and attention. The various chapters deal with personal health of body and mind, with social health, particularly with regard to the younger generation, and with questions of heredity and environment.

Brief mention only is made of the agencies, official and voluntary, which are at work for social health, and occasionally there is some confusion between what *ought* to be and what *is*—*i.e.*, there are, unfortunately, not nearly enough " toddler's clinics " to form the necessary link between the infant welfare centre and the junior school, but there is no hint of this in the paragraph referring to the care of the young child.

There is a long chapter on social health and married life, which, while it contains much that is valuable, one reader found unconvincing in its treatment of certain aspects of the marriage relationship.

MARGUERITE HOWSE.

THE VICTORY OF THE WHITE CHRIST

How Odin and Thor yielded to the power of the " White Christ " is one of the less-known epics of Christendom. Dr. Oppermann's scholarly work* has gathered a fund of information, abundantly documented, from sources remote and sometimes tantalizingly scanty. A description of the mission-field, Sweden and Finland, sets the stage, and the work of St. Anskar and the Hamburg-Bremen mission provides the prologue to the advent of the English missionaries.

The evangelization of the north began late and proceeded slowly. The Continental mission, begun in the ninth century, had but meagre results, and it was not until the twelfth that the monks came to Sweden or that the country became a separate ecclesiastical province—Papal interest awoke tardily. Meanwhile English missionary bishops, coming directly or via Norway or Denmark, had built up a national Church; but it did not quickly produce its own leaders, and to English bishops fell the care of its dioceses. There had been little attempt at forcible conversion in the manner of the converted Viking, Olav Trygvessön, in Norway, or of Erik IX. on his evangelizing crusade to Finland, and the Swedes were tenacious of the old customs and faith. Paganism survived for centuries, but through the zeal of men like St. Sigfrid, who baptized Sweden's first Christian king, or Henry, Archbishop of Uppsala and " Apostle of Finland," the triumph of the White Christ was achieved. The stones of a pagan temple at Uppsala were used to build the church that still stands on its foundations.

The book is chiefly concerned with developments in Sweden, and the evangelization of Finland is told in a last chapter which paucity of materials necessarily makes brief. One could wish that the main actors in this drama were less shadowy figures; but the fault lies with history, which has not spared us details of the men or their work.

* *The English Missionaries in Sweden and Finland*, by C. J. A. Oppermann, M.A., Ph.D. S.P.C.K. 1937. 12s. 6d.

Church Music in History and Practice: Studies in the Praise of God. By Winfred Douglas, Mus. Doc. Charles Scribner's Sons. New York. 1937. $3.00.

Dr. Douglas, who is a Canon of St. John's Cathedral at Denver, Colorado, has long enjoyed a high reputation as one of the leading authorities on Church music in the United States. His book, based on a course of Hale Lectures delivered at Seabury-Western Seminary, should extend this reputation to our own shores. We have many English books on Church music, but none covering the same ground. Here is a book which, in far more than the customary sense of the reviewer's hackneyed phrase, deserves the attention of all who are interested in its subject, and especially of the clergy and choirmasters who are primarily responsible for the music in our churches. It is written with much charm and enthusiasm and is informed throughout by a deeply spiritual outlook. Further, it exhibits a remarkable range of reading and erudition. The writer shews himself thoroughly well acquainted with the voluminous literature of his subject, including the work of the leading contemporary scholars on the Continent. Thus his book is packed with valuable and interesting matter, yet without being at all dull or difficult to read. On certain points a scholar as well equipped as the author himself might be able to question a statement here and there, but usually only because the point is one on which it is possible to hold more than one opinion. It may be added that on the historical side the value of the book is immensely increased by the copious lists of illustrative gramophone records that are appended to its various sections. It is not, however, merely as a scholar that Dr. Douglas would be judged: he writes throughout with a very practical object in view. His primary purpose is to use the historical method to disentangle the principles that should govern the application of the musical act to liturgical worship. His views here are entirely sound, and coincide exactly with those for which the most competent authorities in our own branch of the Anglican Communion have for some time been contending. Dr. Douglas is an enthusiast for plainsong, and has fought a good fight on its behalf in his own country. But he is by no means exclusive in his preferences and has plenty of admiration to spare for Church music of all periods, so long as it is of the right sort. He holds, however, that in the plainsong of the golden age of St. Gregory and his immediate successors we have an embodiment of the principles which are " perennially valid " for Christian worship on its musical side " and to which, " as to standards, contemporary Church music needs from time to time to be compared, and rectified when it departs from them." These principles are set forth in detail, and in the light of them the Church music of later ages is judged and a programme for our own age is laid down. While Dr. Douglas writes specifically for the American public, there is nothing in his book that makes it inappropriate for English readers. If, from what we hear of much American Church music, his own country is in dire need of his monition, there is no occasion for any great self-congratulation in our own. No one can read his book without realizing how far the musical ordering of the services in most English churches falls short of the ideal that he proclaims. An English reviewer, however, may be forgiven if he pleads that the substitution of " Java's isle " for " Ceylon's isle " in Heber's famous hymn is not the effort

of "an English editor, patriotically seeking to uphold the prestige of the British Empire"; it happens to be a restoration of Heber's own original.

C. S. PHILLIPS.

A CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF EZEKIEL. By G. A. Cooke, D.D. T. and T. Clark. 20s.

When Dr. Cooke undertook to write a commentary on Ezekiel, in the early years of the present century, almost all scholars in this country would have accepted the late Dr. Driver's dictum: "No critical question arises in connection with the authorship of this book; the whole from beginning to end bears unmistakably the stamp of a single mind" (*Introduction to the Old Testament*). This view continued to hold the field for many years. It is true that one German scholar had already propounded the theory that our Ezekiel is the result of two independent recensions of the original material, another that copyists had incorporated in the text marginal notes written by scribes, and yet another that the book, as it has come down to us, is a collection of sermon notes, arranged without regard to chronological order. But it was not until comparatively recent times that any serious doubts were felt regarding the traditional views about the date, authorship, and provenance of the book.

It was in 1924 that Hölscher put forward his view that Ezekiel consists of two different documents: one, containing not more than 143 verses out of a possible 1,272, the work of Ezekiel the poet; the other a prose work, compiled later by various redactors. In the early years of the present decade Torrey and James Smith, working independently of each other, reached the conclusion that the scene of Ezekiel's prophetic activities was not Babylonia, but Palestine; but while the one placed him in the Northern Kingdom, the other placed him in Judah and Jerusalem during the reign of Manasseh. According to the latter theory, the prophecies were written about 230 B.C. by an apocalyptic writer. Then came Herntrich in 1932, supporting the thesis that Ezekiel addressed his oracles in person to the people of Judah and Jerusalem, and postulating another prophet who prophesied during the Exile and supplied the Babylonian framework of the book.

In the eyes of those whose minds are made up against allowing supernatural influence in any form, Herntrich's theory has the great merit of liberating Ezekiel from all suspicion of levitation and clairvoyance. It convinced the late Dr. Battersby-Harford in 1935 (*Studies in the Book of Ezekiel*), but it has not convinced Dr. Cooke, who sturdily defends Ezekiel as an ecstatic with the gift of "second sight."

Dr. Cooke has weighed all the objections which have been advanced against the traditional authorship, and felt the force of some of them; but, while allowing a large element of editorial activity, both in the arrangement of the oracles and in the glosses and alterations which have been introduced into the text, he believes that the general plan of the book, and to some extent even the arrangement of the prophecies, may still be attributed to the prophet whose name it bears.

The impression of Ezekiel which Dr. Cooke would leave with us is best given in his own words: "An aweful perception of God, a nature at home in both worlds, faith and courage on a heroic scale, uncompromising hatred of sin, hopefulness for the coming age." Ezekiel's

permanent value consists in the fact that he represents the principles of Law and Prophecy in combination, both being abiding elements in the life of religion.

The notes on the Hebrew text are, as one would expect, full of interesting allusions and information. But those who do not read Hebrew may use this commentary without fear, because the critical and philological notes are easily detachable from the rest of the book. Those who have grumbled from time to time at the long delay in the appearance of the " International Critical " Ezekiel, will be glad that Dr. Cooke has waited long enough to be able to take Hölscher and Herntrich into account, and they will congratulate themselves and him on the publication of a work, as modest as it is learned, which is a credit to English scholarship.

S. L. Brown.

Études sur le Psychologie des Mystiques. By Joseph Maréchal, S.J. Museum Lessianum: L'Edition Universelle, S. A. Bruxelles. 50 fr.

When Père Maréchal penned the foreword to this extremely able and beautiful book, he certainly had only the ordinary reader in mind. He has, however, been of great service to his reviewers for he has, quite unconsciously, written a very good review of his own work.

By " good," I do not, of course, mean eulogistic, for the author is as modest as he is learned; I mean a clear and adequate description of the volume's aim and scope. It is fortunate indeed that he has done so, for no one under Professorial standard ought to review Chapter XIII., " Le Problème de le Grâce Mystique en Islam," while Chapter VI., " Sur les Cîmes de L'Oraison," could only be appraised by a great master of the contemplative life. Let us, therefore, allow Père Maréchal to tell us himself what he meant to do, and what he has actually done, when he set out to write on the psychology of the mystics.

A first volume was published in 1924, and a second volume was then announced. Serious illness unfortunately intervened, and the author decided to give up publication, for he had the true scholar's dislike of offering half-finished work to his public. The publishers, however, insisted. It must have been for them a new and unusual sensation to find themselves vigorously persuading an author that his writings were valuable, while the author was firmly convinced that his MS did not deserve to appear in print. On this occasion the publishers seem to have been entirely in the right. Nine chapters of the great work had already been written, classified together as " groupe de travaux concernant l'intuition de Dieu au sommet de la contemplation." It is very rare to meet with any writing on this difficult subject which is at once so authoritative and so illuminating.

A second group of essays is entitled " Recherches sur la frontière inférieure de la Mystique." This deals with phenomena in which imagination, sense-impression, and so on enter in, and adulterate what is purely spiritual. Père Maréchal deals somewhat severely with Professor Leuba in Essay XI., but is kind enough to say that he objects not to the learned gentleman himself but to the method of which he is the exponent. The final essays are devoted to non-Christian mysticism; and though the author represents himself as having no first-hand knowledge of the subject, his facts and his comments are most interesting.

As mysticism is considered historically as well as psychologically,

the range of the book is very great. Had the volume been completed according to the original plan, it would have been, perhaps, the most notable work on the subject that has ever appeared.

Saints and their experiences have suffered much, both at the hands of psychologists and of unwise admirers. Père Maréchal could safely be trusted to appraise and to admire any saint, canonized or uncanonized, for he would accomplish his task with reticence, discernment and moderation.

ÆLFRIDA TILLYARD.

MORALE ET CORPS MYSTIQUE. By Emile Mersch, S.J. Paris: Desclée, Brouwer et Cie. 25 fr.

P. Mersch, the historian of the doctrine of the Mystical Body, offers here a series of somewhat loosely connected studies on the implications of that doctrine, fully accepted. "Fully," we say, for the author shews how easily we fail to realize its full magnificence—whether for theology or practical living—by our stinting application of it. "The Church prolongs Christ" is his text. Then the doctrine of His complete Divinity and complete manhood is true ideally of her also: of her as a whole, first; and of each member, by membership in her. Thus (for example) we need not fear to assert the value of good works—they are His; nor to claim the merits of the saints—they are Christ's in His people, and because of their unity available for all. From this point of view he studies Christian sanctity, Christian prayer, the idea of priesthood. Each is in essence Christ's, but Christ's prolonged in His members, *as* members of a body. Thus the two fundamental Christian virtues are love (which, he suggests, corresponds to the human body's instinct of self-preservation), co-ordinating the various parts with each other, and obedience, subordinating each to the whole.

The closing group of essays examine Christian poverty; love, marriage and chastity; authority and obedience in various aspects. The dominating note is that the mortifications of the Christian life are never to be regarded as merely negative; they are means of enlargement—poverty a means to fuller possession and sharing of created things, chastity to a wider and more embracing love even than the high calling of marriage, obedience a necessary and enriching bond with the community, and all means of fuller union with God in Christ.

It is good to have spirituality and Christian ethics thus expounded by so wise a theologian, and based throughout on a truth so profoundly Scriptural and relevant to present needs. The author's sense of this is shewn both by an essay and by the quotation from St. Augustine with which he heads it: "Deus, qui solus novit congruentem suis temporibus generi humano exhibere medicinam."

HENRY DE CANDOLE.

THE FOCUS OF BELIEF. By A. R. Whately. Cambridge University Press. 1937. 8s. 6d. net.

What is the central or focal point of the Christian Creed and the Christian Life? Are there many such points, or is there only really one? This is the question which Dr. Whately discusses in this book.

He presupposes theistic belief to start with. The answer given is that the central point of our religion is just Redemption and the Cross. God has entered upon human life to save, to forgive, to redeem. Holding fast this "focus" we shall have a master-key wherewith to interpret all Christian and, indeed, all religious truth.

The author's general sympathies are largely with the school of Barth and Brunner. He sees clearly the inadequacy and superficiality of much that passes under the name of liberalism and modernism. As regards the idea of Redemption itself, he accepts the "classic" theory of the atonement as expounded by Aulen in *Christus Victor*. God's revelation comes to us as an unity. It is creation and the resumption of creation in redemption. These two ideas hang together and cannot be divided. The old creation was incomplete, and its purpose is resumed in redemption. The failure of the human will to realize the purpose of God stopped creation half-way, so to speak. Until man has completely reached his destiny he is imperfectly created. God alone can create, so God must intervene. "Christianity means, from end to end, intervention."

This somewhat bald résumé of the central ideas of this Essay will be enough to shew the freshness and originality of treatment. There are, however, many other incidental sidelights on a variety of important questions germane to the central theme. Thus, the chapters (10 and 11) on "Salvation" are particularly good. The whole book shews evidence of wide and deep reading. It can be well recommended to a thoughtful mind, dissatisfied with much of the fundamentally shallow humanistic thought of the present day.

No serious treatment of so deep and recondite a subject could be expected to provide easy reading. The inherent difficulties of the matter itself would probably make that impossible. It seems a pity, therefore, that in the book before us where so much of real value and importance is said, the author should adopt a compressed, elusive, and elliptical style which gravely adds to the task of comprehension. After a second or even a third attempt the reader cannot always be quite confident that he has fully grasped the meaning intended to be conveyed.

W. R. V. Brade.

Christian Morals. By M. C. D'Arcy, S.J. Longmans. 5s.

A Jesuit at the microphone—and, far away, in their several armchairs, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Methodists, Friends, Baptists, and Congregationalists, to say nothing of Unitarians, Jews, Turks, infidels, and heretics, all peacefully listening-in. Such an astonishing state of affairs suggests that England must be a country in which passions and prejudices have cooled considerably since the time of the Reformation.

And yet the world remains a very disturbing place, and the substance of Father D'Arcy's book does not suggest that the present generation finds it any less puzzling than did their ancestors.

Father D'Arcy is clear-sighted, broad-minded, and large-hearted; in all the categories of persons above-mentioned there will be found men similarly endowed. Why do not they all think alike on every conceivable question of religion and morals? O unfortunate world, in which good people cannot but differ!

Father D'Arcy writes on most of the important arguable questions of the day, including Birth Control, Pacifism and Communism. He points

out the foolishness of imagining, as many folk do, that changing conditions call for a changed morality, and that a comparatively insignificant event, such as the 1914 war, could have altered the nature of right and wrong.

Very interesting and valuable are his explanations of why thoughtful men differ. Very grave are his warnings against light-hearted concessions to human weakness, those temporary palliatives which prevent society from seeking to cure its own mortal sicknesses. Here and there in the book are some very beautiful passages, notably the one on Charity (pp. 61-62). The least convincing chapter is *Pacifism*. For if the foundations of morality lie deep down in the Eternal Order, surely Father D'Arcy is arguing too much on a this-world basis ?

Be this as it may, his book cannot fail to do good. The Anglicans, Presbyterians, Methodists, etc., must all have got up from their armchairs, when the talks were over, determined henceforth to live more Christlike lives; and if the Infidels could not quite go as far as that, they must, anyway, have wished to be better men.

ÆLFRIDA TILLYARD.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF MYSTICISM. By T. Hywel Hughes. T. and T. Clark. 12s. 6d.

Dr. Hughes seems to have read everything that has been written about Mysticism and in dealing with the various expositions and criticisms of the Mystic Way he gives copious quotations. Indeed, if this is to be judged by the ordinary standards of an original work, it must be said that it is overloaded with references to what everybody else has said. This book, however, is based upon lectures delivered to post-graduate students, and, considered as a text-book, it provides a most valuable introduction to the study of Mysticism. The whole field is very carefully surveyed, and the testimony of the Mystics always interpreted with sympathetic understanding. But while giving full credence to the validity of the mystic experience, Dr. Hughes is not uncritical when he examines what the Mystics themselves, and their advocates or antagonists, have said in explanation of the experience.

After a thorough survey of the data of Mysticism, Dr. Hughes proceeds to investigate the Mystic experience in the light of epistemology, psychology and ethics. By far the most valuable contribution is made in the section dealing with Mysticism as an organ of knowledge. Dr. Hughes contends that " in Religious Mysticism no one aspect of conscious life is inoperative. All aspects function with an intensity and harmony not to be found in any other experience. But we must also say that the predominant partner is the feeling element of consciousness, for the Mystics without exception say that when they reach and apprehend the Eternal, they do so through love."

The Mystic's claim to a peculiar kind of knowledge is here upheld, and it is shewn that this knowledge is intuitive. It is akin to our knowledge of persons as distinct from our knowledge about things. And since the Mystic's knowledge is of this intuitive character it gives evidence that what is known is personal. When, however, the Mystics claim that this knowledge is reached by the Via Negativa, they lay themselves open to serious criticism. " Almost all modern writers on Mysticism have condemned the method more or less severely." Such a road can lead only to " complete Transcendence " and to " absolute abstraction."

Mystic experience, however, demands a God who is both immanent and personal. The only escape from this intolerable dilemma is the clear recognition that the mystical absolute and the philosophical absolute are not identical. "If we are to judge of the mystical Absolute by His influence on the life and character of the mystics, we are obliged to conclude that, for them, the Absolute is a fountain of creative power, a centre of self-giving love, a spiritual presence whose fellowship is abundant life and joy."

The psychology of Mysticism is studied at considerable length, and the attempt to discredit the witness of the Mystics by reducing their experience to some mental or emotional abnormality is successfully met. The eccentricities of those mystics who were undoubtedly erotomaniacs must not be taken as typical symptoms of Mysticism.

In the same way the ethical and theological weaknesses discoverable in the writings of several of the Mystics must not be taken as invariable and inevitable concomitants of Mysticism. It has to be admitted, however, that the foundation of Mystical ethics is the discipline of the Mystic Way rather than the active life of fellowship in the world of every-day life. And theologians have not been slow to point out the Mysticism is defective in its teaching on the Atonement and that it is wanting in appreciation for the value and necessity of the Church.

C. H. VALENTINE.

I AND THOU. By Martin Buber. Translated by R. G. Smith. T. and T. Clark. Paper cover, 2s. 6d.

This is a potently stimulating book, and Mr. Smith deserves warm thanks for translating it and high praise for translating it so well that it reads smoothly and intelligibly. This is no small achievement with a book of this character. The price at which it is published is also matter for congratulation.

C. H. VALENTINE.

ON THE BOMBAY COAST AND DECCAN. *The Origin and History of the Bombay Diocese: A Record of* 300 *Years' Work for Christ in Western India.* By W. Ashley-Brown, Archdeacon of Bombay. S.P.C.K. 8s. 6d.

In writing this fascinating book the author has had to deal with an extensive and complex subject, fertile in interests of the greatest variety, replete with splendid historical memories, beset by unsolved modern problems, renewals of confidence following close on frustrations, and squalor seldom far from magnificence. The chronicler's temptation to follow the example of the sundial, "horas non numero nisi jucundas," has not been altogether overcome by the Archdeacon, but it may be that, in a work limited in size, the wisest course was to bring into prominence the things that inspire than fulness for what lies behind and hope for the future. Despite the necessity for severe compression of his material, the writer by his vivid style carries us pleasantly along with him, and he has succeeded in giving an account of the Bombay Coast which, I fancy, will cause not a few of those who have lived long in that land to regret that while they were in India they interested themselves so languidly in its history and traditions. When the great Bishop Francis Lainez, in 1713, visited Rangamati, now a very obscure village in the Diocese of Assam, he confirmed there a thousand Christians! The comparative

disappearance of Portuguese Christianity in the east of India causes food for reflection when, on arriving at Goa today, one finds oneself in a Christian atmosphere. The reference to a " See-house given by Act of Parliament " to the Bishop of Calcutta and to the salary of £5,000 is somewhat misleading. The See-house was granted because, by variation in the rate of exchange, the Bishop of Calcutta's salary had diminished by £750. Is it accurate to say " the solitary reference we have in the fifteenth century to Indian Christianity is that of the Venetian, Nicolo de Conti "? (p. 31).

Something, surely, should have been set on record as to the Rev. E. Hills' work at Bombay Cathedral. The Rev. T. Robinson mentioned on p. 126 was with Heber at Tanjore on the day when the Bishop's body was discovered floating dead in the tank. Appointed by Bishop James to the Archdeaconry of Madras, Robinson in after years was Dean Vaughan's immediate predecessor at the Temple. Former choir-boys of St. Paul's can claim as one of the " old boys " a great missionary priest, Canon King, the elder brother of, and fellow-chorister with, Walter King, whose memory should always live in the history of the Universities' Mission to Central Africa. The Bombay Diocese has been privileged by being served by priests whose names are familiar as also great workers in England.

The admirable illustrations which enrich the book attract attention at once to the fascination of the Bombay Coast, the unspeakably lovely Western Ghats, the religious arts of the people, and its interesting aboriginal population.

W. K. FIRMINGER.

BOOK NOTES

Causality and Implication. By D. J. B. Hawkins. Sheed and Ward. 5s. This short philosophical essay of just over 120 pages contains a sensible defence of the traditional logic of Causality, quoting many modern works including those of the " Logical Positivists." It will not, however, surprise the reader to find that this age-long question remains very much where it did. On some of the topics, such, for instance, as that of Mill's doctrine of " Plurality of Causes," he might complain that a more searching analysis has not been applied. Also, the treatment of the concept and relevance of teleology might perhaps have been expanded. The whole subject is, of course, difficult and full of snares, and so far as it goes this little book is useful and sound.

The Praises of Wisdom. By E. H. Blakeney. Blackwell. 7s. 6d. This book contains the first nine chapters, with a few verses from the eleventh, of the Book of Wisdom. The Greek text is given with an English translation on the opposite page, and there are Introduction, Analysis, and Commentary. The Editor also adds a very useful Glossary of the more remarkable Greek words. *Wisdom* certainly justifies Hesiod's maxim that " the half is more than the whole," and the Editor has done well to leave off where he did. The result is a most pleasing and scholarly volume that will make all lovers of sound learning grateful to Mr. Blakeney. The book is beautifully printed and is a pleasure to handle and read.

Thunder Over Europe. By Dr. H. Gigon. Sands and Company. 3s. 6d. This book, with a sub-title, " Turning Points in European

Politics," is a rapid survey in 124 pages of the several political systems of European countries. The Author passes in review Democracy, Bolshevism, Fascism and National Socialism in turn. Each of these is judged in comparison with a standard of Catholic sociology, "the only sane standards, the Family, Human Rights, and the Ultimate Purpose of Society." The papal Encyclicals dealing with these topics are freely quoted, and many things of interest and good sense are said by the way.

W. R. V. B.

The Gate of Life. By Arthur W. Hopkinson. Mowbray. 1s. 6d. Alternatively "Death and how to face it." Not addressed to those who desire to have a street map of Heaven, Hell, and Paradise, nor written in the manner of those who put together incidental and scattered Scriptural references into a precise and detailed system. Rather, a consecutive series of addresses, based on the general Scriptural revelation of the life beyond. Other ages have sometimes tended to be other-worldly. The writer is of the opinion that our age has witnessed a swing of the pendulum in the opposite direction, and that Christian people of this present age need the corrective of having their thoughts directed back to the life beyond. He deprecates the triviality of modern necromancy and asks for a sober Christian consideration of the great fundamentals of death and its sequel.

God and Man. By A. W. F. Blunt, D.D., Bishop of Bradford. Mowbray. 2s. 6d. Written by the Bishop from the notes of a series of addresses he gave to the Mirfield Community in Retreat. For the theme he quotes: "If we are to worship, we must know what to worship." Its headings are: God's Holiness; Worship; The Purity of God; Penitence; God the King; Service; God the Judge; Fear; God's Love; Surrender. As there is little which is exclusively addressed to a Community, the Bishop offers the addresses to a wider public. The Bishop's combination of experience of handling thought acquired in his academic career, with the experience of dealing with people and their spiritual needs as a parish priest, of authoritative handling of doctrine as a Bishop, together with a conspicuous lucidity of mind, give him outstanding qualifications as a devotional teacher.

H. L. C.

Liturgy in the Parish. Mowbray. 2s. Tracts by members of the Alcain Club on Praying with the Church, The Consecration of the Eucharist, English Use, The Parish Eucharist, The Catholic Altar, and Processions.

Faith and Fact. By W. B. Selbie, D.D. James Clarke. 3s. 6d. Gracefully written short papers on theological topics, which have appeared in *The Christian World* and *The Spectator.*

Christ the Lord of all Life. I.C.F. 1s. A fifth edition of this well-known handbook.

Hebrew Religion between the Testaments. By Thomas Walker, D.D. James Clarke. 3s. 6d. "An Exposition of the Judaism of the Home of Jesus" is the sub-title. The book consists mainly of extracts from the Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, and Rabbinic writings.

W. K. L. C.

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